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ABSTRACT
Historically, companies disseminated financial information via the press release.
The ability to disseminate information now exists on multiple “new media” channels
beyond just the press release, with each channel reaching a different audience. With
the different channels of communication come different connotations and associations
that people have about the channels, which may affect the interpretation of the
message, thereby altering management’s ability to effectively communicate with
stakeholders. I investigate whether retail investors’ processing of financial information
disclosures is dependent upon the fit between the channel and the type of information
sent on the channel. Using the Elaboration Likelihood Model, I experimentally test how
good and bad financial information posted on a social media channel, Twitter, compares
to a more traditional channel, a company investor relations page where financial
information is traditionally posted. I find that Twitter is associated with investors
processing financial information unconsciously on the peripheral route while conscious
or central route processing is associated with information coming from the company’s
investor relations page. Additionally, I find that investors have lower perceptions of
management credibility after viewing financial disclosures on a company’s Twitter feed
than after viewing the same disclosures on the company’s investor relations page.

vi

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Questions and Motivation
Disseminating financial information is a traditional function of the investor
relations departments of public companies. Investor relations activities involve posting
announcements of quarterly and annual financial results, management forecasts, and
more recently, live tweeting of CEO and CFO comments from conference calls. Firms
are now allowed, under recent SEC rulings, to disseminate financial disclosures that fall
under Regulation Financial Disclosure (Reg FD) across multiples channels, such as
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and SlideShare, as long as the channel is disclosed to
investors before the announcement. In a study of 807 companies, Jung et al. (2014)
finds that over 50 percent of the S&P 1500 firms use Twitter or Facebook and 35.2
percent used social media at least once to release earnings announcements. Although
companies use social media for investor relations, they are unsure of how best to
leverage the technology (Barnes and Lescault 2012, Evans 2011). Therefore, it is
important to understand whether a firm’s use of social media for investor relations has a
positive or negative influence on investors. In this study, I investigate whether the use of
Twitter by companies for releasing financial information affects retail investors’
perceptions of management credibility and the consequences thereof. Furthermore, I
investigate whether the effects of releasing financial information on Twitter varies by
news valence (i.e., good news versus bad news).
1

The trend to use social media for business is not limited to companies. A recent
survey of buy-side investors and sell-side analysts found that 12 percent had made an
investment decision after initially sourcing information from Twitter, and 28 percent had
investigated a business issue based on something seen on Twitter (Brunswick Group
2012). Of those polled, 56 percent responded that the role of blogs, micro-blogging
services (i.e. Twitter) and social networking sites in the investment decision process
was increasing (Brunswick Group 2012). Brunswick also found that information sourced
directly from companies has the most influence on the investment decisions of
professional investors. Reg FD was enacted in 1999 by the SEC to ensure that all
investors received material information at the same time. The implicit (untested)
assumption of the regulation is that financial disclosures are interpreted in the same
manner by investors, regardless of channel.
The efficient market hypothesis argues that prices reflect new information,
regardless of where and how the information is disclosed. However, the ability to
disseminate information now exists on multiple channels beyond just the press release,
with each channel reaching a different audience. With the different channels of
communication come different inherent strengths, along with connotations and
associations that people have about the channels. Product channel fit theory posits that
when the strengths of the channel and the characteristics of the product align or fit
together, consumers are best able to achieve their consumption goals (Bang et al.
2013). The strengths of the channel combined with the associations and connotations
that investors have about a channel may not always fit with the characteristics of the
message being disseminated on the channel. The lack of fit between channel and
2

message could interfere with investors’ processing of the information sent. Social
media, as a channel, has experienced rapid growth, and generally refers to activities
integrating electronic technologies with social interactions. It is unclear whether the use
of social media to disseminate financial information would be viewed positively,
negatively, or not any differently from traditional sources. Investors could view a
company as forward thinking, innovative and transparent upon adoption of social media
for financial information dissemination. Alternatively, the same action could be viewed
as an ill-advised attempt at using a medium intended for social interactions for the
serious business of conveying information about financial performance. Incorrect use of
the medium could be attributed to the company’s ignorance of the medium, the
medium’s intended audience, and potentially, what the company itself is and who its
true customers and investors are. Finally, investors may view social media adoption for
financial information as merely one more outlet in the cornucopia of outlets that has
emerged with the advent of the internet, due to familiarity with the media, the company,
or overall desensitization to news events.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that a company is a “nexus of contracts,” in
which a contract is defined as a legal agreement between two parties. A contract can
specify in what circumstances an individual is to be social on behalf of the company, but
the contract itself inherently lacks the qualities necessary to be social. Yet companies
attempt to be seen as social actors by being on platforms dedicated to increasing social
interaction. The message discrepancy, caused by lack of fit, of a non-social actor on a
social platform could cause unintended cognitive dissonance for the message receiver,
causing the message to be processed unconsciously (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The
3

same information could be processed consciously if message discrepancy is absent
and the scenario is viewed positively or even indifferently. The scenario could then be
viewed as an argument rather than a cue, and per the Elaboration Likelihood Model the
information would be processed consciously along with all the other information
participants use to make their decision (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Thus, the research
question is whether investors interpret financial information from different disclosure
platforms the same or whether their interpretations vary across platforms.
I address the research question by conducting an experiment in which I
manipulate disclosure platform, between a company’s Twitter feed or investor relations
page, and whether the company beats (good news) or misses (bad news) analyst
forecasts. I extend product-channel fit theory from the product domain to the information
domain and test the idea that the channel a corporation uses to disseminate financial
information influences investors’ perceptions of management credibility, and ultimately
their judgment and decision about investing in the firm. Using the Elaboration Likelihood
Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), I am able to explain how good and bad financial
information through a company’s Twitter feed compares to the same information posted
on the company’s investor relations page, where financial information is traditionally
posted.
Research is mixed on the influence of news valence. Mercer (2005) predicts and
finds that increased transparency, especially around negative news, increases
management credibility, at least in the short term. Yet Jung et al. (2014) find that firms
rarely release negative news on social media, even when they commit to releasing
financial information on the channel. Lee et al. (2015) finds that firms have to
4

substantially increase the number of posts on social media after experiencing a product
recall to have the same influence as a post on the company website or RSS feed. Liu et
al. (2014) find that firms with negative news are more likely to release positive news
releases to counter the negative news, indicating that firms bundle good and bad news
together (Dye 2013).
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) explains why a perceptual difference
could occur across these disclosure channels via the constructs of routes: peripheral
and central. The central route is the cognitive route taken when a decision is made
consciously, such as assessing the merits of a specific action. For example, the
decision of whether or not to invest in a stock, bond or mutual fund would be processed
on the central route. The peripheral route is the cognitive route taken when a decision is
made unconsciously, such as when one is prompted by a positive or negative cue or
cues. Two people can arrive at the same conclusion to a problem though one uses the
central route and the other the peripheral route. However, those decisions, perceptions
or attitudes that occur because of central route processing are, in general, more stable,
enduring and more predictive of long term behavior compared to those behaviors
arising from peripheral route processing (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
For my experiment, evidence of central route processing was measured using
perceptions of argument quality and disclosure credibility, while evidence of peripheral
route processing was measured using perceptions of perceived usefulness and attitude,
all latent constructs, following Bhattacharjee and Sanford (2006). Participants in the
experiment were shown only one disclosure bundle, starting either at the company’s
Twitter feed (low fit) or investor relations page (high fit), on which headlines for press
5

releases were seen. In the good and bad news conditions, the press releases were
viewed, followed by a Reuters article on the annual report and information about
whether the company missed or beat forecasts. Participants then answered questions
that measure the latent variables. I argue that, compared to the company’s investor
relations page, financial disclosures made via Twitter are less persuasive as measured
by the latent constructs of argument quality and disclosure credibility for central route
processing and perceived usefulness and attitude for peripheral route processing.
Furthermore, I posit that there is an interaction of bad news or missing forecasts with
Twitter that further decreases investors’ perception of management credibility rather
than raising it as predicted by Mercer (2005). Additionally, such an interaction would
explain why Lee et al. (2015) find that firms must issue more social media posts than
company blog posts during product recalls.
To test the research hypotheses, I use 807 participants recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. As proxies for retail investors, participants take on the role of a
member in a hypothetical investment club that had purchased 1000 shares of Lafarge
S.A., a company headquartered and traded on the Paris Stock exchange and active on
social media. Participants were randomly assigned to see Lafarge press releases
announced either on the company’s Twitter feed or investor relations web page followed
by a Reuters article that Lafarge had missed or beat analyst forecasts for the 2012 fiscal
year followed by the press release of the 2012 annual report. Participants then judged
the attractiveness of Lafarge as an investment, recommended the number of shares to
buy or sell to the club, how long to hold the shares and provided perceptions of
management credibility followed by questions related to ELM. Structural equation
6

modeling was used to determine the extent to which participants used either the central
route or the peripheral route in making their management credibility assessment.
ANOVA was used to determine if management credibility varied by platform and news
valence.
I find that investors process financial information posted on Twitter via the
peripheral or unconscious route more so than the central or conscious route.
Furthermore, I find that financial disclosures on social media are associated with lower
overall investor belief of management credibility, which I show to significantly influence
investor judgment and decisions about the company. Additionally, I find that retail
investors seeing financial disclosures on social media have significantly lower
perceptions of the disclosures’ argument quality, credibility and usefulness, along with
overall lower perceptions of the usefulness of the channel. These findings are robust to
whether the investors received good or bad news about the company. Investors seeing
good news had higher perceptions of argument quality, credibility and usefulness and a
more positive attitude towards the channel than those that saw bad news.
This is the first study to investigate how information is perceived and processed
across different communication channels. The findings of this study suggest that when
making financial disclosures, management needs to ensure that there is a strong fit
between message characteristics and the strengths of the channel used to disseminate
the information, as doing so will enhance management credibility. Additionally,
management should not rely upon social media as the sole avenue for financial
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information dissemination until there is a higher fit 1 between the channel and its use for
disclosing financial information. Instead, companies should use as many channels as
possible, preferably more established channels, such as news wires and corporate
websites to issue announcements in compliance with Reg FD. Additionally, the findings
validate the SEC’s trend of allowing Reg FD compliance via new channels, such as the
April 2013 ruling on allowing Reg FD disclosures on new communication channels and
the 2009 ruling to allow Reg FD disclosures on corporations’ blogs. My findings suggest
that continuance of the policy of encouraging transparency regardless of channel should
be supported. The findings suggest that rather than being a catalyst for investor hype,
new communication channels are viewed skeptically by retail investors. Additionally,
the findings inform academics seeking to understand the effects of new communication
channels on retail 2 investors. The study contributes to the academic literature by
extending product-channel fit beyond physical products to include information. Another
contribution is the use of the well-established Elaboration Likelihood Model in the
context of financial disclosures on social media to show how the fit between channel
and message influences investor processing of the message and the subsequent effect
on management credibility.
In the next section, I frame the background to this study and discuss related
literature. Next, I discuss the Elaboration Likelihood Model and hypotheses.
Thereafter, I explain the experimental design and method. Finally, I discuss the results
of the experiment and conclusions.
1

It is outside the scope of this dissertation to investigate the conditions necessary for there to be a higher
fit between social media and their use for releasing financial. However, my results show that five years
after the majority of firms adopted Twitter (in 2009) there is low fit between the channel and financial
disclosures.
2
The synonymous term “nonprofessional investor” is often used in the literature.
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2.0 BACKGROUND & PRIOR LITERATURE
This chapter begins by covering a brief history of social media. Corporations use
of social media for both Regulation Financial Disclosure and other purposes are then
covered. Retail investor use of financial information released by companies is covered
next, followed by retail and professional investor use of social media. Finally, disclosure
strategies of companies for good and bad news is discussed along with the empirical
evidence surrounding said strategies.
2.1 Brief History of Social Media
Before discussing the history of a phenomenon, one should first define the
phenomenon. The same logic holds when discussing the history of social media. Safko
(2012) argues in The Social Media Bible that “social media is the media we use to be
social (p. 3).” The first part of the term, social, refers to the interaction of organisms,
homo sapiens and others, with other organisms. The second part of the term, media,
refers to the technologies we use to make those connections. Being social through
media is then not as novel a phenomenon as the popular press makes the term out to
be, as various media through time have been used to communicate between individuals
and groups. In various regions of the world one can find communication via drums,
bells, the written word, the printed word, cans and string, telegraph, telephone, radio,
television, paintings, photographs, websites, mobile technologies, and text messages,
to name a few.
Standage (2011) points out that even the idea of something going “viral,” or an
idea taking on a life of its own beyond the original creator’s control, goes at least as far
back as Martin Luther, when on October 31st 1517 he nailed his “95 Theses on the
9

Power of Efficacy of Indulgences” to a church door in Wittenberg in present day
Germany. By December, pamphlets and broadsheets of the theses appeared in three
cities in Germany, Leipzig, Nuremberg and Basel, financed by Luther’s friends that had
received copies from him. The original pamphlets were in Latin, but German translations
quickly followed and, Standage argues, spread through social networks. Standage
quotes Luther’s friend Friedrich Myconius who wrote that “hardly 14 days had passed
when these propositions were known throughout Germany and within four weeks almost
all of Christendom was familiar with them,” to support the notion that Luther’s message
had spread rapidly. Standage argues that the 95 Theses spread in a way that would be
familiar even now, as the message spread through decentralized systems whose
members decided which messages were important by sharing them. This could happen
in Luther’s time because the cost of creating printed material had dramatically
decreased since the introduction of Gutenburg’s press in 1450. Since the cost of
obtaining a pamphlet was low (about the price of a chicken,) printers were able to obtain
monetary gain by reprinting and selling more pamphlets, usually in batches of 1,000.
Reprints served as an indicator of an item’s popularity similar to “Likes” and retweets
today. By the reprints indication, Luther was extremely popular. In the first decade of the
Reformation, over 6 million pamphlets were published; over a quarter of those were
written by Luther. Others joined in the debate started by Luther, either for or against, by
also having pamphlets published, notably Sylvester Mazzolini with his “Dialogue Against
the Presumptuous Theses of Martin Luther.” What would now be familiar to viewers in
almost any comments sections of popular websites, Luther and Mazzolini exchanged
blows like argumentative bloggers. The sparring of two writers via the printed words
10

would play out centuries later on the American continent in what is now compiled as the
Federalist papers.
Standage points out that the written word was not the only tactic used. The news
ballad was also used to inform the illiterate and to have them spread it. Woodcuts, a
combination of bold graphics and text were used to inform the masses and served as
visual aids for preachers. The tactics worked and Luther’s enemies likened the spread
of his ideas to the spread of a disease that even the excommunication of Luther could
not stop. Luther’s message had gone viral, to use the modern idiom for the
phenomenon.
The Internet was originally established to provide a decentralized communication
network infrastructure. Several university professors and research departments were
investigating how to send messages electronically in the early 1970s. One the earliest
uses of the Internet was in 1979, when Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis at Duke University
created Usenet. Usenet was a worldwide discussion system that allowed those that
knew about it and had access to it to post messages that could be seen by everyone
that had access to Usenet. Out of Usenet and similar websites came Bulletin Board
Systems (BBS), which allowed users to post code, download games and were generally
hosted locally by technology hobbyists who encouraged the social aspect of the BBS,
which resulted in members of the BBS meeting up in a decidedly social manner.
Compuserve, created in the 1970s for businesses, expanded to consumers in the 1980s
and allowed members to not only use email, but to also access thousands of discussion
forums. American Online (AOL) sped up the acceptance of the computer connectivity
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and its member-created communities, including innovations such as member profiles,
which exist today in other social networks.
One of the earliest social networking sites was Classmates.com, founded in
1995. It sought to link old classmates together. A few years later, in 1997,
SixDegrees.com was established and was one of the very first to allow user profiles,
invite friends, organize groups, and view other profiles. In 1998, Bruce and Susan
Ableson created Open Diary, with the intent of bringing online diary writers into one
community, or social network. Open Diary was the first site to allow comments on
individual entries and to allow public and private diaries. At the same time the term
“blog,” short for web log, came into being. Combining the idea of an online diary and
social network, Friendster.com was established in 2002 and a similar site Myspace.com
followed in 2003. The wildly successful Facebook.com was launched in 2004, with the
business network oriented site LinkedIn.com established in 2003.
While still in their infancy, Facebook, and Myspace, and similar sites were
creating what is referred to as Web 2.0. Web 1.0 was the platform whereby an author,
usually a single person, created static content. Web 2.0 refers to how both developers
and end users utilize the World Wide Web as a platform where content and applications
are continuously updated and modified by all users in a participatory and collaborative
fashion (Kaplan and Haenlien 2010). Blogs and wikis are such examples. Web 2.0 sites
are generally more interactive, having animation, interactivity, and audio/video streams
enabled by Adobe Flash or other languages such as HTML5, Really Simple Syndication
(RSS) that allows for frequently updated content to be pushed to subscribers, and
Asynchronous Java Script and XML (AJAX) that allows the update of web content in
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real time but doesn’t interfere with the display or behavior of the whole page. Web 2.0 is
a technical framework that allows for the synthesis of all ways that people make use of
social media, known as User Generated Content (UGC), as argued by Kaplan and
Haenlien (2010). UGC emerged in 2005 and was defined by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2007 to have three main
requirements: (1) content has to be published on a publicly accessible website or social
network site, (2) content has to show a certain amount of creative effort, and (3) it needs
to have been created outside of professional routines and practices. Such a definition
excludes email or instant messaging (IM) or copying and pasting a newspaper article or
retweet, and all content that has been created with a commercial market context in
mind. Kaplan and Haenlien (2010) argue that “social media is a group of internet-based
applications that build on the idealogical and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and
that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content (p. 61)”.
Social media platforms are not monolithic, as each platform offers similar, though
distinct, functions and users may not subscribe to all platforms. The number of
individuals who use social media continues to grow rapidly; Facebook reported over one
billion active users in 2012 as compared to 845 million users in 2011 and 350 million
users in 2010 (Tam 2013). Despite common misperceptions that most social media
users are relatively young, the average age of Facebook users is approximately 40
years old, with all age groups reporting Facebook use greater than 35 percent (Pew
2013; Pingdom 2012). Twitter users’ average age is approximately 3,7 but has a smaller
reach with only 16 percent of all internet users using the service (Pingdom 2012; Pew
2013). Twitter users are skewed away from those internet users age 65 or older (2
13

percent) compared to 27 percent use among 18 to 29 year olds and 16 percent use
among 30 to 49 year olds (Pew 2013). Overall, over 60 percent of all American adults
are now engaged on at least one social media platform (Pew 2013).
Twitter was originally envisioned as a mobile status updating service between
individuals that answered the question, “What are you doing?” (Twitter 2009). The
prompt changed to “What’s happening?” after organizations and businesses started
using the service to share anything and everything on the network (Twitter 2009).
However, the service is still primarily individual focused, with the top ten followed Twitter
users being prominent individuals in the media, entertainment, and political spheres,
specifically Katy Perry, Justin Bieber, Barack Obama, YouTube, Taylor Swift, Lady
Gaga, Britney Spears, Rihanna, Instagram, and Justin Timberlake, in that order. Katy
Perry has over 54 million followers and Justin Timberlake has a little over 33 million
(Twittercounter retrieved 7/25/14). Similarly, the most retweeted or shared Tweets are
also entertainment based, with Ellen Degeneres’s “selfie” with attendees at the 2014
Oscars currently holding the top spot with over 3.4 million retweets (Favstar 2014).
Before Ellen’s Oscar “selfie,” Barack Obama’s tweet of “Four more years” after winning
the 2012 Presidential election was with 78l thousand retweets. More broadly, a random
sample of two thousand tweets in 2009 found that 40.55 percent and 37.55 percent of
the tweets were classified as pointless babble and conversational, with only 8.7 percent
considered to carry any pass-on value. News from mainstream news organizations was
3.6 percent of total tweets, with spam and self-promotion rounding out the sample with
3.75 and 5.85 percent of total tweets respectively (Kelly 2009). When Twitter users were
asked how often they use the site to post their own content and what content they post,
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the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2010) found that 72 percent posted
updates related to their personal life, 62 percent shared content related to their work life,
with 55 percent sharing links to news stories and 54 percent retweeting material posted
by others. Sharing photos, videos and location information were the least likely to be
shared.
2.2 Corporations’ Use of Social Media
2.2.1 Determinants
Previous research has investigated determinants of corporations’ use of
conference calls (Tasker 1998, Frankel et al. 1999, Bushee et al. 2003), corporate
websites (Ettredge et al. 2002, Debreceny et al. 2003, Kelton and Yang 2008), press
releases (Bamber and Cheon 1998), analyst meetings (Bamber and Cheon 1998),
restated versus standalone 8-K filing (Myers et al. 2013) and conference presentations
(Bushee et al. 2011). Only one study, Jung et al. (2014), has empirically investigated
the determinants of financial reporting via social media, in particular via Facebook and
Twitter. Investigating firms on the S&P 1500, the authors find a positive association
between firm size and Twitter use, and a negative association between firm size and
Facebook use for earnings news. The finding of larger firms using Twitter is contrary to
the argument put forth by Blankespoor et al. (2014) that smaller firms benefit more than
larger firms from Twitter use. Jung et al. (2014) do find that firms with low analyst
followings are more likely to use social media platforms for earnings dissemination,
similar to the argument by Blankespoor et al. (2014). The size of the firms’ social media
presence, which Jung et al. (2014) proxy using the number of “followers” on Twitter or
Llikes” on Facebook was found to be negatively associated with firm use of the
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platform(s) for earnings news, indicating that large firms with large social media
presence are using the platforms more for advertising or other marketing purposes and
not to reach investors. Whereas prior literature on voluntary adoption of disclosure
platforms had found market-to-book (MTB), firm performance (ROA) and growth to be
positively associated with adoption of the disclosure channel, these findings do not hold
in the adoption of social media platforms. Looking at firms that commit to earnings
releases on social media, Jung et al. (2014) find that none of the traditional measures
hold for committed disclosure on Facebook and only size is statistically significant for
firms’ commitment to disclose on Twitter. Overall, Jung et al. (2014) find that a large
social media presence, as measured by Twitter and Facebook followers, is positively
associated with reporting earnings on Facebook and Twitter. This finding is interesting
as it implies that knowledge of the media and the firm’s audience, as shown by the
ability to build a social presence, is more important to the decision to release financial
information on social media than financial resources or future prospects.
2.2.2 Use of social media for non-Reg FD disclosures
One of the earliest and most comprehensive surveys of 2,847 executives by
McKinsey in 2007, asked how executives are using Web 2.0 technologies. 70 percent of
the McKinsey respondents were using some combination of technologies to interface
with customers. Fifty-one percent were using Web 2.0 to interface with suppliers and/or
partners, with 75 percent using the technologies to manage collaboration internally with
half using it for knowledge management and the remainder using it for product design
and development.
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In 2010, Culnan et al. found that 53 percent of the Fortune 500 companies had
adopted Twitter, 46 percent had adopted Facebook, 20 percent were using blogs and
11 percent were using client-hosted forums. Rybalko and Seltzer (2010) investigate
dialogic communication among 93 randomly sampled Fortune 500 companies with
active Twitter accounts (i.e. those that have posted within one month). They classified
61 percent of firms as dialogic (or two-way communication) firms with the remainder, 39
percent, as non-dialogic (or one-way communication) firms. Gathering ten tweets from
each firm, they find that the most common two-way communications were the
companies’ responses to specific users posts, 58.1 percent tweeted newsworthy
information about the company, while 30.1 percent attempted to create a dialog by
tweeting a question. In general, 74.5 percent of the tweets surveyed by Rybalko and
Seltzer were directed at a general audience, followed by 23.7 percent of tweets directed
at specific users and 0.9 percent to ‘other’ audiences, with only 0.4 percent directed at
employees. Mirzoyan (2013) sampled 166 Fortune 500 firms, finding slightly different
results than Rybalko and Seltzer (2010), with 49 percent of sampled firms using nondialogic communication and up to 70 percent of all posts representing one-way
communication. Only 24 percent of firms had balanced strategies of one-way and twoway communication. Only 27 percent of firms had mostly two-way communication.
In a study of the 100 largest nonprofit organizations’ utilizations of Twitter,
Lovejoy and Saxton (2012) find that the 58.6 percent of the tweets are one-way
communication classified as information, 25.8 percent of tweets are around community
with the largest percentage (13.2) dealing with giving recognition and thanks. They also
found that 14.3 percent of tweets were two-way communication such as responses to
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reply messages (8.2) or response solicitation (4.1). The remainder of tweets (15.6
percent) dealt with calls for action, such as promoting an event (7.8) or a donation
appeal (3.1), which were the two highest, respectively.
Meske and Stieglitz (2013), investigating the adoption of social media inside
German corporations via an online survey, find improved communication, faster access
to in-house information and knowledge, and improved collaboration access are the
main drivers of adoption across small, medium and large enterprises. Positive influence
on corporate culture, faster access to in-house experts, reduction of travel costs, and no
goal or no added value are the lowest ranking objectives of adopting social media such
as wikis, blogs and internal social networks.
2.2.3 Use of social media for Reg FD disclosures
In regards to firm use of social media for financial information, Barnes and
Lescault (2012) find both Fortune 500 and Inc. 500 companies are keenly aware of
social media, expending considerable financial resources to engage users across
various social media platforms. A study of 807 publicly traded companies found that 63
percent use Twitter, 40 percent use Facebook, 29 percent use YouTube, and 18
percent use their corporate blogs to disseminate investor-related material (Joyce 2012).
Currently, 23 percent of Fortune 500 companies engage in blogging to communicate
with social media users, while 44 percent of Inc. 500 companies do so (Barnes and
Lescault 2012). Additionally, in a 2012 survey of 170 Inc. 500 executives, 44 percent
responded that their company intended to increase social media spending, while 41
percent intended to maintain current spending levels. Firms’ social media spending has
consistently increased over the past eight years (Barnes and Lescault 2012).
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Jung et al. (2014) investigated the use of Facebook and Twitter for earnings
releases by the S&P 1500 firms and find that 35.2 percent of firms (232 total) had
released earnings news at least once on Facebook, but only 18.53 percent of those
firms who had released earnings on Facebook continued to do so (43 total firms or 2.87
percent of S&P 1500 firms). The numbers are better for the 1500 largest corporations’
adoption of Twitter for earnings news, with 57.3 percent (406 total) using the platform.
Additionally, 22.17 percent (90 total) out of the 406 firms continue to do so, representing
six percent of the S&P 1500 firms.
In the largest study to date, Zhou et al. (2015) studied 9,861 firms’ use of social
media and find that 49 percent of firms have adopted either Facebook or Twitter, with
30 percent adopting both, and the largest number of firms adopting in 2009. Collecting
1,140,382 posts from Facebook and 3,433,846 tweets from Twitter, Zhou et al. use a
support vector machines learning algorithm to classify the posts and N-fold cross
validation test to evaluate the classification performance of the algorithm. They find that
92.94 (7.06) and 96.55 (3.45) percent, respectively all of Facebook posts and tweets
are non-disclosure (disclosure) messages. Of those message that are related to
disclosures, only Twitter is the preferred platform for financial disclosures, with 30.24
percent of tweets versus 16.8 percent of posts dealing with financial disclosures, of
which segment information made up 7.14 percent of disclosure tweets (8.33 percent of
Facebook posts), 22.47 percent of tweets (7.33 percent of Facebook posts) were
related to financial reviews of the company with a small percentage (0.54) of tweets
dealing with stock price information versus 1.15 percent of Facebook posts. Of those
disclosure tweets not classified as financial disclosures, 3.6 percent were about general
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corporate information, 2.02 percent on corporate strategy, 2.72 percent on acquisitions
and disposals, 10.6 percent on research and development and 0.52 on future prospects
for a total of 19.46 percent overall dealing with strategic disclosure messages. The
majority of disclosure tweets dealt with either information about directors (23.86
percent) or social policy and value added information (18 percent), with the remainder
(8.44 percent) related to employee information. Zhou et al. (2015) find that financial
disclosures messages are the fastest-growing type of disclosure messages on Twitter
between 2009 and 2013, while non-financial disclosure messages are the fastest
growing disclosures on Facebook for the same time period.
2.3 Investors’ Use of Social Media
Companies can and do use social media in a variety of ways, from advertising to
soliciting feedback from customers. The purpose of this study is to investigate how
different communication channels influence retail investors. Prior literature has shown
that retail investors can influence stock prices (Barber and Odean 2008, Barber et al.
2009, Burch et al. 2014, Hvidkjaer 2008, Kaniel et al. 2008, Kumar and Lee 2006).
Small investors have been found to be net buyers of stocks after both good and bad
earnings news, especially when the magnitude of the news is large (Hirschleifer et al.
2008). Experimental research on different information channels and their influence on
investors is limited, in particular on the influence of social media. Trinkle and Crossler
(2014) find that investors’ reactions to good and bad news communicated over social
media is influenced by the attached comments and that comments can change the
valence of the news to the point where bad news disclosures were perceived as good
news.
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There are a few articles, mostly working papers, that investigate the role of social
media in information dissemination and how investors are using the channels. Jung et
al. (2014) show that trading volume increases after earnings announcement tweets and
that trades greater than $50,000 are the primary drivers of the increased trading
volume, indicating that larger investors are reacting to the news via Twitter rather than
small investors. Jung et al. (2014) argue that counter to the belief that social media
“levels the playing field” for small investors, firms’ use of the platform for financial
disclosures actually increases information asymmetry, since it is large investors that
appear to be taking advantage of the earnings announcement tweets.
Curtis et al. (2014) find that abnormally high levels of investor attention, as
measured by social media activity, are associated with higher sensitivity to market
returns to earnings news. In particular, high levels of attention increase sensitivity of
returns by 234 percent for positive news and 91 percent for negative news. While low
levels of investor attention are associated with significant post-earnings-announcement
drift, but not for firms with normal to high levels of investor attention. These results are
robust to traditional measures of attention to earnings announcements. Additionally,
high investor attention is found to increase the sensitivity of returns to earnings when
firms announce earnings pre-market opening, along with decreasing the post-earnings
announcement drift. The opposite effect is found for firms that announce after the
market closes. Looking at the sentiment of tweets, the authors find higher market
returns for the group with the highest optimism on the day of the earnings
announcement; these results are robust to the inclusion of media attention, proxied for
by Dow Jones Newswires, financial blogs, and Google searches.
21

Helms and Werder (2013), analyzing the compositions of social networks around
Europe’s twenty-five largest software vendors, find that firms have a small internal
audience but a large external audience, and the followers of the companies are distinct
and unique from each of the other companies analyzed. An AMO Global Survey (2014)
of 105 institutional investors from 12 countries reports that corporate websites are more
respected and used than corporate social media sites. Thirty-three percent of the
investors surveyed indicated that they use social media as a “heads up” and in
exceptional situations. Possibly the reason institutional investors do rely on social media
is that 85 percent of surveyed investors said social media sites are not reliable, similar
to the finding by Oh et al. (2013) with only 17 percent responding that social media is
usually reliable. Institutional investors did believe that social media would grow in
importance for financial communications. The AMO survey revealed that professional
investor use of social media varied widely by region, with 40 percent of USA based
investors consulting social media very frequently compared to France and Poland
where 80 percent of the surveyed investors never consult social media. However, 37
percent of institutional investors regarded social media in financial communications as a
welcome innovation, with 82 percent expecting the use of social media to grow in
financial communications in coming years. Newswires were consulted very frequently
by 76 percent of the respondents and was found to be always reliable 30 percent of the
time and usually reliable 57 percent of the time. Newspapers are the second most
widely consulted and slightly less trustworthy in the institutional investor with 61 percent
consulting them frequently with 13 percent finding them always reliable and 66 percent
rating them as usually reliable. Corporate websites were considered the most reliable,
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with 42 percent of respondents rating them as always reliable and 50 percent rating
them as usually reliable. However, corporate websites are consulted less frequently,
with only 36 percent doing so very frequently and 31 percent frequently visiting globally.
However, 90 percent of institutional investors in the United States consult corporate
websites very frequently, with 70 percent considering the websites as usually reliable
and 20 percent finding the sites as always reliable. Investors in the United States lead in
relying on Twitter professionally, with 40 percent doing so regularly and another 40
percent doing so occasionally. Fewer US based investors consult Facebook
professionally with 72 percent never doing so and only 10 doing so occasionally.
Prior literature has shown that even small changes to how financial information is
presented can impact investors. Hodge et al. (2010) experimentally show that the
presentation of related financial information in close proximity on a page has a positive
influence on investors, and that the presentation of related financial information on
different pages has a negative effect.
In similar vein, Maines and McDaniels (2000) find that nonprofessional investors’
judgments of management performance only reflect the volatility of comprehensive
income when comprehensive income is disclosed in its own statement and not in the
statement of stockholders equity. Elliot et al. (2012) find that investors recommend
investing different amounts in a company after a financial restatement, depending on
whether the CEO announces the restatement via text or video. The Elliot et al. (2012)
experiment simulated an investor getting all their information from the company’s
investor relations website, by providing participants with financial press releases only
from the company and then having them read the text of the announcement or watch a
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video of it. It is unclear what investors’ responses would have been had Elliot’s
information been posted on less traditional media, such as Twitter and Facebook, and
investors had to process the additional cues inherent to social media. The additional
cues may cause investors to assess the disclosure credibility of press releases
differently, which in turn could lead participants to make different decisions.
2.4 Firm Strategies around Good and Bad News
Prior research has investigated company disclosure of two types of financial
information--positive and negative. Empirical evidence suggests that managers disclose
bad news to reduce litigation and reputational costs (Skinner 1994, Suijs 2005, 2007,
Ge and Lennox 2011). Since large investors do not like to be surprised, managers can
mitigate loss of institutional ownership and analyst coverage by releasing bad news
early (Skinner 1994). Soffer et al. (2000) find that managers in possession of bad news
release all the information at the preannouncement date versus managers with good
news who only release a portion of the good news at the preannouncement date. Firms
with negative earnings surprises have lower excess returns both before and after the
earnings announcement (Soffer et al. 2000). The finding of negative earnings surprises
having lower excess returns is consistent with managers’ having differential disclosure
strategies for good and bad news and Soffer et el. (2000) posit that how information is
presented to the market can influence the reaction to the information.
Suijs (2007) proposes an analytical model of voluntary disclosure showing that a
partial disclosure equilibrium is possible when firms disclose negative or bad information
to the market and find support for proprietary costs influencing disclosure decisions.
Although managers tend to disclose negative information, they still resist doing so until it
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is necessary (Kothari et al. 2009, Dye 2010), as compared to good news where they
disclose up to half of it early (Ge and Lennox 2011). Additionally, the market is aware of
managers’ resistance to full disclosure and responds accordingly to predictable
managerial bias in forecasts (Rogers and Stocken 2005).
Empirical research finds that firms are more likely to tweet good earnings news
than bad earnings news (Jung et al. 2014). However, most firms use social media
inconsistently, with only 6 percent of S&P 1500 firms consistently doing so. Additionally,
Jung et al. (2014) find that the market responds to the news, as evidenced by the threeday signed returns being higher, the absolute return being lower, and the bid-ask
spread being higher for firms releasing earnings announcements via social media.
Additionally, the market responds positively to firms that consistently release earnings
news over social media (Jung et al. 2014).
Bhagwat and Burch (2014) find that firms whose frequency of tweets is greater
than the median number of tweets earn higher post-earnings announcement returns
than before they joined Twitter. When the positive surprise from a firm is small,
increased tweets, both in general and financial specific, are associated with higher postannouncement returns for all periods investigated by Bhagwat and Burch, that is the
before, during and after earnings announcements windows. It is only for the small
positive surprises that they find the association and it is particularly pronounced for low
visibility firms, as proxied by size and analyst following. The authors also find that firms
with small earnings surprises have greater financial tweet intensity in the postannouncement window, suggesting that firms attempt to strategically focus investor
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attention when efforts are more likely to influence returns. The authors find that strategic
tweeting is more pronounced for firms that more often engage in earnings management.
Investigating press releases related to product and services (P&S), Liu et al.
(2014) find that firms with market capitalizations below the median are more likely to
release P&S press releases during the earnings announcement window. The likelihood
of a P&S press release is 80 percent higher if the firms’ reported earnings are in the
bottom decile of firms. If the firm is small, the odds increase to 90 percent that the firm
will release P&S information during the earnings announcement window. Over 80
percent of P&S press releases announce the signing of new business contracts or the
release of new products, suggesting that firms time the release of good news, albeit not
earnings related, in an attempt to mitigate the effect of negative earnings news. The
authors find that firms releasing non-earnings information benefit the firm, especially
when it comes to garnering media attention, with the media three times more likely to
cover a P&S press release during the earnings announcement window and is four times
more likely to cover the P&S press release if the earnings news is extremely negative.
Additionally, if the press picks up the P&S news, even if only one media article is
produced on the P&S for the firm, then announcement returns are 6 percent higher for
firms in the bottom quintile of negative earnings surprises. The positive response does
reverse over 60 days showing that investors overreact to the good media coverage.
Overall, the findings of Liu et al. (2014) are concentrated in smaller cap firms. This
finding indicates that firms strategically bundle good news with the bad earnings news,
similar to Dye (2013), but that the strategy works especially well if the media covers the
good news.
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Other studies have looked at the role social media has played in product recalls
and how firms use social media to disseminate information around the event. Lee et al.
(2015) find that stock price reaction around firms with a social media presence, which
they broadly define as corporate blogs, RSS, Facebook or Twitter accounts, is less
pronounced than without a social media presence. Additionally, the authors find the
attenuation benefits from social media are significantly lower from Facebook and Twitter
than from those provided by corporate blogs and RSS feeds. Lee et al. argue that the
lower attenuation benefits from Facebook and Twitter is due to the firms’ diminished
control over the content on those platforms. Lee et al. (2015) show that negative market
reactions to a recall can be exacerbated by the number of tweets about the recall by
other users but attenuated by the number of tweets by the firm, indicating that firms still
have some credibility with the public even after a recall when credibility is low.
However, while Jung et al. and Blankespoor et al. (2014) find that the market
responds positively to firms’ use of social media as measured by abnormal returns, they
find contrary evidence around bid-ask spreads. Both studies are archival studies and
cannot explain why the use of social media by firms results in their findings, nor how
social media platforms are perceived as financial disclosure platforms absent good or
bad news. In particular, the studies above cannot explain why small investors are not
responding to earnings announcement via social media but larger investors are (Jung et
al. 2014) nor why Twitter and Facebook do not have the same attenuating influence on
the market as corporate blogs and RSS feeds (Lee et al. 2015).
The evidence is mixed on the use of social media for financial information
disclosure. Joyce (2012), Barnes and Lescault (2012) and Brunswick Group (2012) find
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that companies and investors are using social media for various uses including
dissemination and aggregation of financial information. However, Barnes and Lescault
(2012) find that companies are unsure of how best to leverage social media. Jung et al.
(2014) report that little over half of the S&P 1500 firms have either a corporate
Facebook page or Twitter account, but only 6 percent regularly release quarterly
earnings announcements. I propose that the reason firms are unsure of how to use
social media, especially for financial disclosures, is that retail investors perceive
financial information posted on social media sites differently from the same information
posted on more traditional sites and thereby respond in a manner that firms are not
accustomed to. I test this theory using the Elaboration Likelihood Model.
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3.0 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
3.1 Product Channel Fit
The theory of product-channel fit was proposed by Bang et al. (2013) as an
extension of the marketing theory of channel capabilities attributed to Avery et al.
(2013). A channel capability is “an enabling characteristic of channel that allows
consumers to accomplish their shopping goals” (Avery et al. 2013 p.96-97). Testing the
addition of a mobile channel to an established online channel for an e-retailer in Korea,
Bang et al. (2013) find that the performance impact of an additional channel depends
upon the product characteristics and the subsequent product-channel fit. A
characteristic of a company investor relations web page is that it is a Web 1.0
technology, in that it only allows one-way flow of information, from the company to the
consumer. Twitter and other social media technologies employ Web 2.0 technology, in
which sociality between the company and the customer, between customer and
customer, or three-way conversations between participants around user-generated
content is possible.
Communication is a core dimension of both Web 1.0 and 2.0 platforms, but not
all platforms are equal in information, collaboration, and relationships (Fauser et al.
2011). For example, social networks are mostly used to maintain relationships whereas
wikis are mainly for collaboration. Microblogs, such as Twitter, have the characteristic of
being highly effective in terms of reach and timeliness, but are ineffective for in-depth
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consumer information (Fauser et al. 2011). Consequently, not all platforms are equally
suitable, i.e. a “good fit,” for all information available to post on the web. I extend
product-channel fit theory from the context of fit between physical products and
purchase channels to the fit between information and communication channel. I argue
that investors who view a communication channel as being highly relevant and a good
fit for the information disseminated on the channel will incorporate that information into
their decision making. Compared to investors that view a communication channel as
being irrelevant, or a poor fit, for obtaining information will not use the information in
their decision making process. Furthermore, investors who find the platform a good fit,
for the dissemination of financial information are less likely to experience message
discrepancy between the channel and the information. By contrast, investors who
perceive the channel to be a poor fit for spreading financial information are more likely
to experience message discrepancy. Message discrepancy may in turn cue or prompt
the investor to process the information unconsciously. One way to measure if investors
process information consciously or unconsciously is through the use of dual process
theories (Chaiken and Trope 1999, Evans 2008), such as the elaboration likelihood
model. I test whether product-channel fit influences retail investors’ perceptions of the
release of financial information and use Elaboration Likelihood Model for explaining how
good fit and poor fit manifest themselves in the way the information is processed by the
investor.
3.2 Elaboration Likelihood Model
The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) is a dual processing theory, which posits
that influence travels through two routes—the central route and the peripheral route.
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The route is based on the type of information processed by a user, so that task-relevant
arguments follow a central or conscious route, while secondary (less-relevant) cues
follow the peripheral or unconscious route. The central and peripheral routes are
different in at least two ways. First, different types of information are processed on each
route. Arguments or information relevant to an individual’s particular decision, such as
whether to invest in a particular stock, are processed on the central route. Information
that is irrelevant to the decision but still influences the decision represent tangential
cues that get processed on the peripheral route. Secondary irrelevant cues foster
message discrepancy and as such influence peripheral route processing (Petty and
Cacioppo 1986). Second, the central route requires higher cognitive effort, due to the
information processing that is required, compared to the peripheral route.
The central route is akin to how we expect a strictly rational human (e.g. homo
economicus) to approach a problem: thoughtful comprehension of the arguments, their
quality evaluated, followed by a synthesis of conflicting arguments to form an overall
judgment. The peripheral route only requires associations with salient positive or
negative cues related to the object (Petty el al. 1981). Finally, perception/attitude
changes that occur via the central route are, in general, more stable, more enduring,
and are more predictive of long-term behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Changes that
occur via the peripheral route are less persistent, open to counter influence, and less
predictive of future behavior.
ELM explains the circumstances under which information consumers may be
more influenced by one route than the other, and posits that there are different longterm effects of each route (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Prior research has assumed that
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investors process information on the central route as they seek to determine the
fundamental value of a firm. Further, research has shown that the presentation format of
financial information results in different investment decisions, which contradict the
wealth maximizing/rational man hypotheses and lend support to dual process theory at
work in investing decisions (e.g. see Hodge et al. 2008, Maines and McDaniels 2000,
Elliot et al. 2012). However, prior research on the topic of investor decision making has
not provided a theory for the observed behavior. ELM appears to be uniquely suited to
the exploration of the “black box” of influence within a financial reporting context, and
may provide an explanation to prior observations.
There has been little research in accounting using ELM or dual process theories,
the notable exception being Farrell et al. (2014) where the effect of performance-based
incentive contracts versus a fixed pay contract is investigated when managers are in a
high affective state using the dual process theories’ general terms of System 1 and
System 2 (Kahnemean and Frederick, Stanovich 1999). The authors find that in an
emotional context, performance-based contracts invoke more System 2 processing than
fixed wage contracts and decrease the proportion of economically costly choices. Much
more accounting research has focused on the role affect plays in other accounting
settings, such as managerial decision making (Kida et al. 2001, Moreno et al. 2002,
Ding and Beaulieu 2011), management credibility (Mercer 2005), memory (Kida et al.
1998, Rose 2001, Rose et al. 2004), ethical judgments of auditors (Cianci et al. 2009),
and stock price judgments (Victoravich 2010).
Information systems research has primarily investigated the role of ELM in
technology acceptance (Bhattacharjee and Sanford 2006, Lee and Xia 2011, Li 2013),
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website privacy (Lowry et al. 2012), web personalization (Tam and Ho 2005, Ho and
Bodoff 2014), information system continuance (Chuang, et al. 2011), online content
influence on attitudes and buying intentions (Kumi and Limayem 2012), ERP systems
(Jung et al. 2013), promotion of enterprise social networks (Abdulrahman and Darshana
2014), and social media marketing (Chang et al. 2015).
Affect does play a role in ELM but not in the way suggested by Farrell et al.
(2014), who argue that System 1 or automatic processes are reliant upon affect and
intuition. Petty et al. (1998) argues that affect is a variable in ELM. Variables, such as
affect, can influence individuals in four ways: (1) as a persuasive argument, (2) as a
peripheral cue, (3) by influencing the extent or direction of argument processing, and (4)
by biasing the elaboration (Petty and Wegener 1999). Variable have been theorized to
serve in all four roles but no studies have shown this to be the case.
Variables, such as affect, are then able to influence attitudes by different
processes and take on different roles depending on where the variables are along the
elaboration continuum. Variables play the role of peripheral cues when they are on the
low end of the elaboration continuum, and as arguments or bias information processing
when they are high on the elaboration continuum. Variables are most likely to influence
the amount of thinking when they are in the middle of the elaboration continuum. Based
on the multiple roles that variables, such as affect, play in ELM, it is unknown what route
participants used in Mercer’s (2005) study, in which she finds that affective reactions
significantly influence investors to change their perceptions of management’s reporting
credibility in the long term but not in the short term. In fact, information processing on
the central route is in general more, stable, enduring, and predictive of long-term
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behavior. In Mercer’s (2005) study participants indicate that they processed the
affective information via the central route as it influenced their long-term perceptions of
management credibility. The findings are contrary to what Farrell et al. (2014) argue
should happen.
3.3 Hypotheses
Social media generally refers to activities integrating electronic technologies with
social interactions. A face-to-face social interaction is a multi-sensory experience, in
which verbal, non-verbal and contextual signals are simultaneously processed by the
communicating parties. The multiplicity of signals holds true in social media, with words,
pictures, audio and even video now capable of being transmitted across various social
media platforms intended either for all interested parties or to only one person. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) argue that a company is a “nexus of contracts.” Following logically
from the aforementioned definition, it would be inherently difficult, if not impossible, for a
nexus of contracts to be social. A combination of a non-social actor, such as a
company, being on platforms dedicated to increasing social interaction, could be an
inconsistency associated with the message source (i.e., the company). Inconsistencies
between the message and the receiver’s beliefs and knowledge are referred to as
message discrepancy. Message discrepancy is a cue that could cause the message to
be processed on the peripheral route by the message receiver. Following ELM,
message discrepancy cues lead to cognitive dissonance which causes the message to
be processed on the peripheral route instead of the central route. In my experiment, I
test whether a low product-channel fit is associated with message discrepancy, as
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measured by the degree to which financial information released on Twitter is processed
by participants on the peripheral route.
ELM suggests that argument quality (via the central route) and peripheral cues
(via the peripheral route) directly influence attitude and belief change. Argument quality
refers to the persuasive strength of arguments that are embedded in a message.
Peripheral cues refer to the message source but do not refer to the message’s
embedded arguments. Peripheral cues used in the ELM literature often rely on the
environmental characteristics of the message, such as perceived credibility of source,
quality of presentation, attractiveness of the source, or in the case of marketing, if the
slogan is easily remembered (i.e., ”catchy”). Disclosure credibility is defined as the
extent to which a disclosure is perceived to be believable by information recipients
(Mercer 2004, 2005). Following Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), I measure
disclosure credibility and attitude to establish whether social media causes messages to
be processed using the peripheral route.
To establish the extent to which participants use the central route, I measure
argument quality and perceived usefulness. Argument quality refers to the ability to
persuade or the strength of the argument embedded in a message. Perceived
usefulness refers to the degree to which a person believes using a specific system
would enhance job performance (Davis 1989). Message arguments are intended to be
processed rationally by users rather than emotionally, argument quality is expected to
influence perceived usefulness of an information channel in financial reporting situations
where the information is relevant to an individual’s investing decision.
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Figure 1 Research Model
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Attitude

Likewise, my measure of peripheral cue--disclosure credibility of a message--is
expected to influence attitude, as both cues appeal to human affect rather than rational
judgment. Both measures are expected to be influenced by the message discrepancy of
companies, who are non-social actors, posting information to a social site.
Companies that post financial information on social media channels must utilize a
disclosure bundle since Facebook and Twitter have inherent limitations. For example, in
the case of Twitter only 140 characters are allowed. Accordingly, company financial
announcements on Twitter are generally headlines with a link to the full press release
about the announcement on the company’s investor relations page. Using the ELM
theoretical framework, I test for differences between Twitter and the corporate investor
relations web page in links between constructs indicative of central route processing or
peripheral route processing. In the ELM research model (Figure 1), evidence of central
route processing stems from argument quality, influencing perceived usefulness which
in turn influences the eventual judgment or decision. By contrast, evidence of peripheral
route processing stems from disclosure credibility influencing attitude which in turn
influences the eventual judgment or decision. I predict that retail investors viewing
press releases on Twitter will exhibit stronger peripheral route processing, while retail
investors viewing press releases on the investor relations web page will exhibit stronger
central route processing. Formally, I hypothesize as follows:
H1:

Participants viewing financial disclosures on Twitter (IR web
page) will exhibit stronger peripheral (central) route
processing than central (peripheral) route processing.

Financial reporting credibility can be decomposed into disclosure credibility and
management credibility (Mercer 2004, 2005). Disclosure credibility has been defined as
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the believability of a particular disclosure as perceived by investors. Disclosure
credibility is appraised independently for each disclosure, and thus may vary by different
disclosures within the same firm. Management credibility is defined as managers’
competence and trustworthiness as perceived by investors. ELM does not make any
predictions about the influence different routes will have on an individuals’ end decision.
Rather, ELM only predicts that the route does influence the final decision or judgment.
In this study, participants’ judgment is management credibility. The cognitive
dissonance caused by the message discrepancy of a non-social actor (i.e., the
company) posting information to a social platform is expected to influence participants’
judgments of management competence and trustworthiness. The formal hypothesis
follows:
H2:

Participants will judge management as less credible when
viewing financial disclosures posted on the company’s Twitter
feed than on the company’s investor relations web page.

The elaboration likelihood model argues that the influences of argument quality
and disclosure credibility are contingent upon potential users’ motivation and ability to
elaborate on informational messages (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Following
Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), I operationalize the motivation dimension of the ELM
as relevance. Relevance is defined as investors’ perceptions of the relevance of using
either a company’s Twitter feed or company investor relations web page to obtain
financial information. I operationalize the ability to elaborate on financial information as
investors’ investing experience. Expert or experienced investors are more skeptical of
new information related to companies and identify key information quicker and with less
cognitive effort than less experienced investors. Experienced investors will be less
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swayed by peripheral cues compared to inexperienced investors, since experienced
investors tend to be more aware of the possibility of inaccuracy or management bias.
Expert investors’ superior knowledge, formed over time and with experience, reduces
the influence of peripheral cues, since they know that they can form more accurate
perceptions of the company by critically examining the press releases. In comparison,
novice or less expert users are more prone to the influence of peripheral cues such as
disclosure credibility, rather than the facts or message arguments contained in the
communication, in framing their attitude and perceptions that form their perceived
usefulness judgments.
Prior literature has mainly focused on the credibility of the disclosure from
management and the consequences a credible disclosure has on the market (Williams
1996, Hirst et al. 1999). Jennings (1987) finds that the reaction of investors to earnings
forecasts is dependent upon how unexpected the forecast is and how credible or
believable it is. Jennings finds that forecasts with the same level of surprise but with
different levels of credibility will elicit different responses from investors, with the more
credible forecast causing greater investor belief changes, revisions to portfolios, and
changes to security prices. Hutton et al. (2003) find that bad news earnings forecasts
are always considered informative by the market but that good news forecasts are
informative only if they include credible forward looking statements. Kothari et al. (2009)
conclude that prior studies have interpreted the evidence of positive and negative news
as either managers accelerating the release of bad news or the market viewing bad
news disclosures as more credible. Kothari et al. (2009) posit that market participants
may find disclosures of bad news to be more credible than disclosures of good news, as
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management has various incentives to embellish news (Rogers and Stocken 2005).
Additionally, prior literature has documented that companies are hesitant to release
negative information on social media platforms, even if doing so would increase their
credibility (Jung et al. 2014). Alternatively, the interaction of negative news with the
cognitive dissonance caused by a non-social entity posting to a social platform could
cause participants (both experienced and less experienced investors) to perceive
disclosure credibility as low, as they seek to alleviate the dissonance, and the negative
news would provide further justification for doing so. On the other hand, information on
social media has been shown to be subject to rumors and misinterpretations (Oh et al.
2013). Consequently, good and bad news posted on social media could be perceived
as being less useful to retail investors and thus influence their attitude towards the use
of the media for releasing financial information. Investors, especially those investors
with more investing experience, should have more negative associations with the
platform since they are accustomed to seeing financial information released on more
traditional platforms, such as the company’s investor relations web page. The decrease
in argument quality, and subsequent reduction in perceived usefulness, could temper
investor judgments and decisions. I argue that social media moderates investors’
responses to both good and bad news, as disclosure credibility influences multiples
constructs, which in turn influence judgments and decisions. To test the aforementioned
argument, I compare the overall models for each news condition against all other news
conditions. The formal hypothesis is as follows:
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H3:

Social media (Twitter) will moderate the effect of positive or
negative financial news attenuating the judgments of retail
investors, compared to the same news released on traditional
media (IR web site).

Following the research model proposed by Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), I test
each model for differences across the following conditions: Twitter and good news,
Twitter and bad news, company investor relations web site with good news, and
company investor relations web site with bad news. Empirical testing of the hypotheses
is described in the next section.
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4.0 METHOD
I test the hypotheses using an experiment employing a 2 x 2 disclosure channel
by news type between-subjects design. The first factor of disclosure channel has two
conditions: Twitter feed or company investor relations site. The second factor is news
type and is operationalized as whether the company beats (good) or misses (bad)
analyst forecasts for the annual report.
4.1 Experimental Participants
The participants were 807 retail investors recruited through Amazon Mechanical
Turk (average years investing was 6.00, average age was 33.11 years, average work
experience was 11.85 years) living in North America. Each was paid $1 to participate in
the study3. Participants could not participate in the study unless they answered in the
affirmative that they had bought or sold stocks in the past 12 months. Recent studies
have found that data collected through online crowdsourcing applications, such as
Amazon Mechanical Turk, does not differ substantially from the more traditional
methods of data collection of panels and student proxies (Steelman et al. 2014, Farkas
and Murthy 2013, Farrell et al. 2014). I randomly assigned participants to experimental
conditions, and participants in all conditions completed the experiment online.

3

Participants on average took 14 minutes and 15 seconds to complete the study. The compensation of
$1 thus equates to an average hourly wage of $4.20.
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4.2 Case Materials and Procedures
Modifying the case from Elliot et al. (2012), I instructed participants to assume
the role of a member of a local investment club and that they had been asked at the last
club meeting to monitor, evaluate, and make a recommendation to the club regarding
one company, Lafarge S.A. 4 Lafarge is a real world publicly traded company on the
Paris stock exchange under the ticker symbol LG, and is an international producer of
cement, gypsum wallboard, and related products. Lafarge S.A., was chosen due to its
extensive posting on Twitter of investor-related links, financial information, and noninvestor related material. The company also has a Facebook page and investor
relations page on the company website. Lafarge stock is not traded on any North
American stock exchange and is primarily a business-to-business enterprise, so
participant familiarity with the company is expected to be similar to a fictitious company,
despite being the world’s largest cement manufacturer. A post-experiment questionnaire
shows that participants were not familiar with Lafarge with an overall average of 1.73 on
a 7 point Likert scale, where 1 equals “Not at all familiar,” and 7 equals “Very familiar.”
Following Elliot et al. (2012), I informed participants that they would view press
releases that the company had released on popular investor relation sites during 2012
and 2013. They were then to use this information to make and justify a recommendation
to the club of whether it should increase or decrease its investment in Lafarge. Lafarge’s
actual press releases were shown as screenshots to participants. The HTML code for
each page used in the study (press releases, Lafarge Twitter and Facebook pages, and
4

Elliott et al. (2012) used executives M.B.A. students for participants and had simulated participants
working for an investment firm. The participants for the current study are retail investors so the use of a
local investment club is more appropriate while still providing the benefits of following a previously
published study.
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the investor relations page) was first downloaded then altered to reduce the complexity
of the web pages. For example, ads were removed from the Reuters page, and the
current stock price of the company from the investor page. The Twitter page for the
company was altered to show only eight posts from the company from the thousands of
tweets that the company had posted up to that time 5. Screenshots were then taken of
each page to increase external validity, but also to remove the possibility that
participants would click on hyperlinks and not complete the study. Longer press
releases were built by taking multiple screenshots of the press release, and then
stitching them together using Adobe Photoshop. Participants were shown all five press
releases in the same order.
4.3 Initial Exercise
Participants began by reading a profile of Lafarge. Taken from Bloomberg
Business Week, the profile stated that Lafarge is a worldwide company, founded in
1833, and is traded on the Paris Stock Exchange. The profile also provided financial
ratios for Lafarge versus the industry average, number of employees and the countries
in which Lafarge operates. Next, participants viewed either Lafarge’s Twitter feed or the
company’s investor page. Eight posts from Lafarge’s verified Twitter feed about press
releases were shown on each page. Twitter and Facebook pages had the hashtags
#Press #release, in front of each headline and a shortened URL at the end of the
message that took them to the press release on the company investor relations page.
For example, #Press #release 2012 full year results http://t.co/4cL7xsZn. For the
company investor relations page, the hashtags and the shortened URL, items that are

5

As of 3/11/15 Lafarge S.A. Twitter handle @LafargeGroup had 6,335 tweets.
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unique to social media platforms, were removed to maintain internal validity. The
removed information was visible elsewhere on the page; the slight wording differences
in the headings are not expected to have a significant effect on the results. Although the
complete headlines are not exactly the same, the primary headlines are the same. The
choice not to include platform specific information, such as hashtags and URLs, was
made to strengthen the internal validity of the experiment. 6 Specifically, the additional
information would only increase mundane realism 7 and could increase the complexity of
the experiment for participants, potentially biasing against finding results (Hodge et al.
2008).
After viewing the page of press release headlines, participants in the good and
bad news conditions saw the press release from 7/27/2012 announcing Lafarge Q2
2012 results from the companies’ investor relations page was shown. Participants were
then shown the press release headlines page. The pattern of headlines page followed
by the press release on the company investor relations page, was repeated for three
more press releases, one announcing a sale of assets in the United States, one
announcing construction materials company. A Reuters story on the Lafarge’s fourth
quarter results was then shown. The press release announced that earnings had either
beat or missed analyst expectations. The press releases for quarters two and three do
not mention analyst expectations and whether they are met or not, so the
announcement of beating or missing expectations was meant as a surprise to the

6

See Appendix A for example of headlines shown in both conditions.
Peecher and Solomon (2001) argue that increasing “mundane” realism in experiments can be
detrimental to internal validity if it distracts the participants from the constructs in question.
7
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investors. Participants were then shown the press release from Lafarge for the fourth
quarter, and were asked to make a recommendation to the investment club.
4.4 Management Credibility
I informed participants that the club’s current investment in Lafarge was 1,000
shares. Following Tan and Koonce (2011), I asked “How attractive is Lafarge as an
investment?” for the judgment question. For the decision question, I asked “By what
number of shares do you recommend the club change its current 1,000 share
investment in Lafarge S.A.?” following Elliott et al. (2011). Participants indicated their
recommendation on a slider scale with a floor of -1,000 and a ceiling of 1,000.
Participants were next asked, “How long do you recommend the investment club hold
its investment in Lafarge S.A.?” Participants indicated their recommendation on a slider
scale with a floor of 0 months and a ceiling of 120 months with 12 month intervals.
Participants were then asked to list between one and three key factors supporting their
recommendations. Finally, management credibility was assessed using the following
questions from Nelson and Rupar (2014). I asked “I think Lafarge S.A.’s management
has the competence necessary to make clear and unbiased financial disclosures on
Twitter/the company’s website.” Then I asked, “I trust Lafarge S.A.’s management to
make clear and unbiased financial disclosures on Twitter/the company’s website.”
Competence and trustworthiness have been shown to be the main factors that make up
management credibility in prior literature (Mercer 2005).
4.4 ELM Measures and Post-Experimental Questions
After making their recommendations, participants answered one manipulation
check question (a recall question). All participants then responded to a series of
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questions designed to measure attributes that make up the ELM. Questions and their
theoretical basis are described in the next section. Finally, participants answered how
frequently they used the platform that displayed the press release headings, what
broker they use to trade with, how much the broker charges per trade, and provided
demographic information.
4.5 Dependent Variables
Management credibility is the main variable of interest and was measured using
two questions, one related to management’s credibility the other related to
management’s trustworthiness. Both questions were measured on an 11 point Likert
scale, on which 1 equaled “strongly disagree” and 11 equaled “strongly agree.”
I am using ELM as a lens in this study to determine how retail investors process
financial information from different channels and how those processes influence
investor’s perception of management credibility. However, it is also important to
determine what consequences investor’s perception of management credibility has.
Mercer (2005) finds a link between cognitive reactions and change in management’s
reporting credibility in the short term, while affective reactions have a strong link to
changes in management’s reporting credibility in the long term. In both determinants
models change in management’s reporting credibility significantly influences investors’
willingness to rely on subsequent disclosure (a judgment). I measure investor
judgments and decisions using three measures. Investor judgment was measured
using the question regarding the attractiveness of Lafarge as an investment, on an 11
point Likert scale, on which 1 equaled “very unattractive” and 11 equaled “very
attractive,” matching the terms and scale used by Tan and Koonce (2011). Investor
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decisions were measured using two questions. First, by the number of shares by which
participants recommended to the club to either increase, up to 1000 shares, or
decrease, down to 0 or -1000 shares, in its investment in Lafarge. Second, by
participants recommendation of how many months the investment club should hold
Lafarge’s stock. Length of investment was measured on a slider scale, starting at 0, with
a maximum of 120 with 12 month intervals in between.
4.6 Process Variables
The ELM identifies the route through which individuals process persuasive
messages. Central route processing is measured using argument quality and perceived
usefulness. Peripheral route processing is measured using disclosure credibility and
attitude. Argument quality was measured using four Likert scaled items validated by
Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), which measured the extent to which participants
believed the information provided by each platform was informative, helpful, valuable,
and persuasive. Disclosure credibility was assessed using a modified version of
Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s (2006) four-item Likert scale for source credibility. Two
items from the original scale that examined participants’ perception of the disclosure’s
trustworthiness and credibility were retained. The terms “knowledgeable” and “appeared
to be an expert” were dropped and replaced with “honest” and “reliable.” The latter
change was necessary since Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s experiment dealt with the
persuasiveness of an individual, while this experiment deals with the credibility of an
organization’s financial statements. Therefore, the original questions were not logical in
that context. Perceived usefulness was measured using four Likert scaled items
developed and validated by Davis et al. (1989) that asked for participants’ perceptions
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of productivity, performance, and effectiveness gains from venue acceptance, and
overall usefulness. Attitude was measured using Taylor and Todd’s (1995) four-item
semantic differential scale anchored between “bad…good,” “foolish…wise,”
“unpleasant…pleasant,” and “like…dislike” adjective pairs for the question, “using
(Twitter, company investor website) for the task performed is a....” Relevance was
assessed using a modified version of Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s (2006) two-item
Likert scale. An additional term “necessary” was added to the terms “important” and
“relevant (appropriate)” and the wording “from my job” was dropped from each term.
Validation of the aforementioned scales above is described in the next section.
User experience was measured using the average of investing experience, work
experience and age. The investing experience variable is participants' open ended
response to the question of how many years of investing experience they had. The work
experience variable measured how many years of professional work experience the
participants had. Participants entered their age in years in a text box for the age
variable. The variable Platform is a categorical variable where Twitter equals 1 and
company website equals 0. The News type variable is a categorical variable where
good news equals 1 and bad news equal 0.
4.7 Control Variables
Participant familiarity with the disclosure platform was measured with the
question, “How often do you visit (use) company websites/Twitter feed?” using a 7 point
Likert scale anchored by “Never” and “A great deal.” Accounting knowledge was
measured by the number of accounting classes participants had taken post high school.
General business knowledge was measured as a continuous variable of the number of
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business classes taken post high school. I measured participants' familiarity with
Lafarge using a 7 point Likert scale anchored between “Not at all familiar” and “Very
familiar.”
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5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Memory Test
To assess participants’ attention levels, I asked, “Did Lafarge S.A., meet, beat or
miss analyst forecasts in the fourth quarter?” Sixty-six percent (532 out of 807) of
participants correctly answered this question before answering the fifteen latent variable
measure questions, but after the five questions related to the recommendation to the
investment club and management credibility, and reading the company’s fourth quarter
press release. The announcement that Lafarge missed or beat earnings was in the
headline of the Reuters article and was also in the second headline of the article. The
moderately high correct response rate is acceptable considering the number of
distracting items of information between the manipulation information and the question.
Similar results were found when participants were asked the multiple choice question
“Assets = Liabilities + _____” and had to choose from either Stockholder’s Equity,
Revenue, Net Income, Long Term Liabilities at the end of the post experiment
questionnaire. Out of 807 responses, 491 people correctly answered the question for a
60.84 percent correct response rate. Participants also paid little attention to how many
followers the Lafarge S.A. had on their Twitter feed (7,713). Only 233 out of 406, or
57.25 percent, viewed the Twitter feed correctly and answered that Lafarge had
between 5,000 and 10,000 followers. Westerman et al. (2012) finds that Twitter users
with approximately 7,000 followers had the highest credibility estimates from
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participants. Thus, indicating that Lafarge S.A. had 7,713 followers, within the range
specified by Westerman et al. (2012), biases against finding results for disclosure
credibility and the construct’s subsequent influence on attitude. Excluding participants
who failed one or more of the memory checks does not materially change any of the
results reported below. In section 5.9, I report results using a reduced sample of only
participants who passed the manipulation check questions.
5.2 Scale Validation
The Cronbach’s standardized alpha of the two item measure of management
credibility was 0.846. For the 4-item measure of argument quality the Cronbach’s
standardized alpha was 0.913. For the 4-item measure of disclosure credibility
Cronbach’s standardized alpha was 0.954. Perceived usefulness was measured with
four items with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.936. Attitude was measured on a
4-item measure with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.912. Relevance was
measured on a 3-item measure with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.915. User
experience was measured with three items with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of
0.896. All measures have an alpha greater than 0.9 except User Experience which has
an alpha that is 0.004 below 0.9, which constitutes excellent internal consistency (Kline
2000). Therefore, the conditions for reliability are met. Table 1 presents the means,
standard deviations, minimum and max for each measure along the unstandardized
alpha score.
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TABLE 1 Validation of Instrument
Panel A: Question Used
I think Lafarge S.A.’s management has the competence necessary to make
MANCR clear and unbiased financial disclosures on the company’s (Twitter feed,
company website).
I trust Lafarge S.A.'s management to make clear and unbiased financial
MANTR
disclosures on the company's (Twitter feed, website).
Financial information provided through the company’s (Twitter feed, website) is/was…
AQ1
Informative
AQ2
Helpful
AQ3
Valuable
AQ4
Persuasive
Financial information provided through the company’s (Twitter feed, website) is/was…
SCR1
Trustworthy
SCR2
Credible
SCR3
Honest
SCR4
Reliable
Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information (will)…
USE1
Increase/Increased my productivity (e.g., make my work faster).
USE2
Increase/Increased my performance (e.g., make my work better).
USE3
Make (Made) me more effective (e.g., help me make better decisions).
I found the company's (Twitter feed, website) to be useful for obtaining
USE4
financial information.
Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information
ATT1
is/was a (Bad, Good) idea.
Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information
ATT2
is/was a (Foolish, Wise) idea.
Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information
ATT3
is/was a (Unpleasant, Pleasant) idea.
Overall, I (Dislike, Like) the idea of obtaining financial information from the
ATT4
company’s (Twitter feed, website).
Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information was…
REL1
Important
REL2
Relevant (appropriate)
REL3
Necessary
AGE
How old are you?
EXP
How many years of professional work experience do you have?
INVEST How many years of investing experience do you have?
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Panel B
Scale
Item
N
Item
Mean
AQ1
807
5.27
AQ2
807
5.12
AQ3
807
5.07
AQ4
807
4.62
Argument Quality
DCR1
807
4.88
DCR2
807
5.01
DCR3
807
4.96
DCR4
807
4.95
Disclosure Credibility
USE1
807
4.55
USE2
807
4.56
USE3
807
4.73
USE4
807
4.97
Perceived Usefulness
ATT1
807
5.03
ATT2
807
4.94
ATT3
807
4.82
ATT4
807
4.86
Attitude
REL1
807
4.96
REL2
807
5.13
REL3
807
4.67
Relevance
INVEST
807
6.00
EXP
807
11.85
AGE
807
33.12
User Expertise

Item S.D.

Min

Max

1.42
1.44
1.46
1.54

1
1
1
1

7
7
7
7

1.38
1.37
1.32
1.37

1
1
1
1

7
7
7
7

1.61
1.59
1.64
1.56

1
1
1
1

7
7
7
7

1.57
1.52
1.50
1.74

1
1
1
1

7
7
7
7

1.63
1.56
1.78

1
1
1

7
7
7

6.45
9.37
10.35

0
0
18

42
52
73
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Standardized
Alpha
0.883
0.872
0.874
0.919
0.913
0.935
0.941
0.945
0.939
0.954
0.918
0.907
0.915
0.929
0.936
0.862
0.878
0.929
0.874
0.912
0.945
0.892
0.896
0.915
0.951
0.797
0.793
0.896

5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the means of the dependent and independent variables
discussed above, along with the Pearson correlations. Platform is a categorical variable
coded as 1 if participants were shown the Twitter feed and 0 if shown the investor web
page. News is a categorical variable coded as 1 if participants were shown the Reuters
page announcing that Lafarge beat forecasts and 0 if Lafarge missed forecasts. Of
particular interest is the negative correlation between the dependent variable
management credibility and the process variables of attitude, disclosure credibility,
perceived usefulness, argument quality, and relevance with platform. Also of interest is
the positive and significant correlation between the dependent variables. The
correlations partially support the hypotheses.
5.4 Assumption Testing
5.4.1 Assumptions for Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one is tested using structured equation modeling (SEM). This section
presents the analysis of structured equation modeling assumptions. The analysis will be
performed in SEM using the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method. The ML
estimation method is a normal theory method in that ML assumes multivariate normality
of continuous outcome variables. Three criteria must be met for multivariate normality:
(1) all variables individual univariate distributions are normal, (2) the joint distribution of
any pair of the variables is bivariate normal, (3) all bivariate scatterplots are linear, and
the distribution of the residuals is homoscedastic.
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Table 2 - Pearson Correlations
Variable

1

Mean

1

2

3

4

1

AQT

20.08

2

SCRT

19.80

0.68

3

USET

18.81

0.77

0.65

4

ATTT

19.65

0.69

0.65

0.79

5

RELT

14.75

0.72

0.60

0.80

0.79

6

MANSCR

7

REC

8

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

15.00

0.53

0.65

0.53

0.54

0.45

342.56

0.28

0.29

0.23

0.25

0.24

0.42

ATTRACT

7.36

0.41

0.42

0.35

0.34

0.31

0.55

0.68

9

TIMEREC

38.24

0.17

0.17

0.16

0.11

0.12

0.20

0.25

0.21

10

USER

4.41

0.31

0.25

0.36

0.38

0.39

0.16

0.06

0.10

0.01

11

FAMIL

1.74

0.08

0.11

0.13

0.08

0.10

0.09

-0.01

0.05

0.12

0.14

12

ACCT

2.77

0.06

0.04

0.06

0.02

0.01

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.01

0.16

0.20

13

BUS

2.36

0.03

-0.01

0.02

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.05

0.02

-0.02

0.20

0.05

0.65

14

REVIEW

2.96

-0.10

-0.11

-0.12

-0.10

-0.11

-0.05

-0.06

-0.07

-0.02

-0.19

-0.18

-0.20

-0.20

15

NEWS

0.50

0.15

0.16

0.10

0.13

0.08

0.15

0.25

0.28

0.03

0.09

-0.02

0.00

-0.01

0.01

16

PLATFORM

0.50

-0.32

-0.15

-0.31

-0.28

-0.42

-0.10

-0.01

0.04

-0.05

-0.26

-0.05

-0.03

-0.05

-0.03

0.00

17

USER EXP

16.99

-0.01

-0.01

-0.05

-0.01

-0.03

0.10

0.04

0.08

-0.05

-0.06

-0.08

-0.06

0.01

0.10

0.03

16

-0.01

Coefficients in bold are significant at p < .10. Pearson correlations are below diagonal.
1
Variables are defined as follows: AQ = summed scores of four questions on argument quality, SCR = summed scores of four questions on source
credibility, USE = summed scores of three questions on source credibility, ATT = summed scores of four questions on attitude, RELT = summed scores of
three questions on perceived relevance, REC = number of shares recommended to purchase, ATTRACT = attractiveness of Lafarge S.A. as an investment
measured using a 11 point Likert scale, TIMEREC = number of months recommended to hold the stock, USER = frequency of use of platform measured
using a 7 point Likert scale, FAMIL = participant’s familiarity with Lafarge S.A. measured using a 7 point Likert scale, ACCT = number of accounting
classes taken post high school, BUS = number of business classes taken post high school, REVIEW = participant’s frequency of reviewing company
financial information measured using a 7 point Likert scale, NEWS = 1 if the participant saw information on the Reuters website about Lafarge beating
analyst expectations, 0 if the participant saw information on the Reuters website about Lafarge missing analyst expectations, PLATFORM = 1 if the
participant saw information on the Lafarge Twitter feed, 0 if the participant saw information on the Lafarge investor relations page, USER EXP = the
average work and investing experience and age .
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The first criteria was examined by plotting the factor scores computed using a
varimax rotation for argument quality, perceived usefulness, disclosure credibility,
attitude and management credibility, along with attractiveness, recommendation and
time recommendation. The normality assumption for each variable was tested using the
Shapiro-Wilks test for each variable. The test revealed that the variables were not
normally distributed. However, the Shapiro-Wilks test has been shown to be sensitive to
slight departures from normality (Mendenhall and Sincich 2012). So variables were
plotted against the normal probability plot and verifying that the output for each variable
is a straight diagonal line. The plots reveal that there is positive kurtosis in most of the
variables. However, none of the variables have kurtosis values greater than 1 which is
well below the absolute value of 10 suggested as a problem level by Kline (2011). To
test for multivariate normality the factor scores from all five factors were added to
together then plotted against the normal probability plot and verifying that the output is a
straight diagonal line. The plot reveals that there is positive kurtosis. However, the
kurtosis is small at 0.5 well under the absolute value of 10 proposed by Kline (2011). A
Shapiro-Wilks test confirms that the data is not perfectly multivariate normal but the
plots show that the data is very close. The ML estimation technique has been shown to
be robust to departures from normality (Savalei 2010, Bagozzi and Yi 2012, Yuan et al.
2012). Therefore, despite the variables failing the assumption of normal distribution, I
will rely on the robustness of the ML estimation technique.
5.4.2 Assumptions for Hypotheses Two and Three
Hypotheses two and three are tested using the analysis of variance (ANOVA)
test. ANOVA has three main assumptions: (1) independence of observations, (2) that
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the dependent variable is normally distributed, (3) and equality of variance across
groups . Independence of observations is ensured by no one participant taking the
survey twice and participants being randomly assigned to the conditions. The
dependent variable for hypotheses two and three is the sum of the two management
credibility questions. The sum of the two values was plotted against the normal
probability plot, and I verified that the output was a straight line. In addition, a ShapiroWilks test was performed on the variable. The tests show that management credibility is
not normally distributed due to positive kurtosis. However, the positive kurtosis is small
at 0.06 and is negatively skewed at -0.48 and Shapiro-Wilks test is sensitive to slight
departures normality (Mendenhall and Sincich 2012). As kurtosis and skewness is quite
small, the data is arguably normally distributed but not perfectly so.
To test the second assumption of constant variance, a scatterplot of the residuals
versus the predicted dependent variable, using a continuous independent variable
(age), was created. There appeared to be no patterns to indicate unequal variance in
the scatterplot. In addition to the scatterplot, Levene’s test was conducted. Levene’s test
revealed the assumption of constant variance was not satisfied (p=0.0257). However,
ANOVA is robust to departures from normality and variance if the cell sizes are
approximately equal. My cells have slightly over 200 to 203 observations each, so I will
rely on the robustness of ANOVA in my testing of hypotheses two and three.
5.5 Test of Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis predicts that participants viewing press releases on Twitter
will exhibit stronger peripheral route processing than central route processing, while
participants viewing press releases on the company’s investor relations web page will
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exhibit stronger central route processing than peripheral route processing. I test these
predictions by conducting four structured equation model (SEM) analyses. The analyses
test how participants’ process financial information released on different communication
channels, and how the route the participants use affects participant’s perceptions of
management credibility. The first SEM analysis examines participants’ route processing
for information from the company’s investor relations page and the company missing
analyst forecasts for the fourth quarter or bad news (Figure 2 Top Panel A). The second
SEM analysis examines the routes processing for information from the company’s
Twitter feed and the company missing forecasts (Figure 2 Bottom Panel A). The third
SEM analysis shows the route processing for information from the company’s investor
relations web page and the company beating analyst forecasts (Figure 2 Top Panel B).
The fourth SEM analysis examines the route processing for information from the
company’s Twitter feed and the company beating analyst forecasts (Figure 2 Bottom
Panel B).
The data appear to fit the model well. For all models, the comparative fit indices
(CFIs) are all greater than 0.93, suggesting good model fit (Hu and Bentler 1999).
Following the methods outlined in Loehlen (2004), I compared the constrained model for
each condition to each unconstrained model and using a χ2 difference test to determine
if the models are statistically different, I find that all models are statistically different from
each other (χ2 min = 57.161, max = 92.075, two-tailed p < .01).
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Figure 2 Processing Routes of Retail Investors by Platform and News Valence with Consequences
Panel A: Platform by Bad News
Website and Bad News
Argument
Quality

0.614***

Perceived
Usefulness
(0.639)

0.217**
Disclosure
Credibility

0.589***

0.503**
Management
Credibility
(0.426)

Attitude

1.441***
193.633***
7.555***

(0.419)
Recommendation
(0.173)
Recommended
time to hold

NS

0.180

0.264***

Attractiveness

(0.063)

(0.639)
Twitter and Bad News
Argument
Quality

0.584***

0.291***
Disclosure
Credibility

Perceived
Usefulness
0.638***

(0.673)

0.394***

0.281***

Attractiveness
(0.440)

Management
Credibility
(0.487)

Attitude

1.437***

0.333***

225.186***
9.764***

Recommendation
(0.235)
Recommended
time to hold
(0.127)

(0.742)
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Panel B: Platform by Good News
Website and Good News
Argument
Quality

0.801***

NS

0.123
Disclosure
Credibility

NS

Perceived
Usefulness
0.790***

0.673***

(0.808)

Attractiveness
(0.313)

Management
Credibility
(0.481)

NS

145.564***
NS

0.063

0.026

Attitude

0.006

0.961***

Recommendation
(0.174)
Recommended
time to hold
(0.004)

(0.631)
Twitter and Good News

Argument
Quality

0.598***

0.274***
Disclosure
Credibility

0.739***

0.837***

NS

0.142

Perceived
Usefulness
(0.631)

(0.222)

Management
Credibility
(0.315)

0.140**

Attitude

Attractiveness

0.437***

140.487***
4.054**

Recommendation
(0.159)
Recommended
time to hold
(0.026)

(0.696)
NS

***, ** Indicates p < .01, .05 two-tailed respectively. indicates p > 0.10 two-tailed. Bold links are significant at p < .05. Parentheses
indicate R2 values. Figure 2 reports the standardized regression coefficients for four structured equation model analyses examining
(1) whether retail investors process financial information on the central route of argument quality and perceived usefulness or the
peripheral route of source credibility and attitude, and (2) whether changes in management's reporting credibility affect investors'
view of the attractiveness of the stock, how many shares of the stock they recommend buying and how long they recommend the
shares be held. Participants' responses to argument quality, perceived usefulness, source credibility, attitude, and management
credibility were measured using the questions outlined in Table 1.
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Overall, H1 predicts that the links for the two models in the Twitter condition will
have a significant link between the latent construct of attitude and management
credibility, but not a significant link between perceived usefulness and management
credibility. The opposite is predicted for the two models in the investor relations web
page condition, with significant links expected between perceived usefulness and
management credibility, but missing significant links between attitude and management
credibility. Figure 2 shows all four conditions. The Twitter and good news model (Panel
B) shows a significant link on the peripheral route between attitude and management
credibility (β = 0.437, two-tailed p < 0.01), but not a significant link between perceived
usefulness and management credibility (β = 0.142, p > 0.10). Compared to the investor
relations web page and good news model that shows a significant link on the central
route between perceived usefulness and management credibility (β = 0.673, p < .01),
but not a significant link on the peripheral route between attitude and credibility.
The Twitter and bad news model shows a significant link on the peripheral link
between attitude and management credibility (β = 0.333, p < 0.01) and a significant link
on the central route from perceived usefulness to management credibility (β= 0.394, p <
0.01). By contrast, in the investor relations web page and good news model, the link
from the central route from perceived usefulness to management credibility is significant
(β = 0.503, p < 0.05) but the link from the peripheral route to management credibility is
not significant (β = 0.180, p > 0.10). Interestingly, investor relations web page and good
news is the only condition in which there is not a significant link between disclosure
credibility and perceived usefulness and attitude, indicating that retail investors process
good news from a company’s investor relations page almost entirely on the central
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route. Overall, H1 predicts that participants in both news valence conditions in the
Twitter condition will exhibit stronger peripheral route processing than central route
processing, while participants in the investor relations page condition will exhibit
stronger central route processing. The results partially support H1, suggesting that retail
investors receiving financial information via Twitter process the information at a more
unconscious level. Additionally, the results suggest that investors who go to the
company’s investor relations page to get financial information process the information
on the central or conscious route. Overall, the results suggest that the channel through
which management chooses to release financial information matters in determining
investors’ beliefs about management credibility.
5.6 Consequences of Reporting Channel on Management Credibility
The structured equation model analyses also examine the consequences of
different communication channels to management’s reporting credibility. Prior literature
has found that management reporting credibility influences management’s ability to
communicate with investors, and investors’ willingness to rely upon management’s
information (Williams 1996, Hirst et al. 1999, Mercer 2005). All participants were asked
three questions: how attractive the stock was, how many shares they would recommend
the investment club to buy, and how many months they would recommend holding the
stock. Panels A and B in Figure 2 show the links in the models between participants’
management credibility score and their rating of how attractive the stock is as an
investment, how many shares they recommend buying and how long to hold the
recommended shares. All links are significant in the models except the link between
credibility and recommended time to hold in the investor relations page and bad news
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condition which is insignificant at p > 0.10. The results suggest that the choice of
disclosure channel does indeed influence investors’ judgments and decisions via
investors’ beliefs about managements’ credibility. The next section discusses the
differentiate effects of platform and news valence on management credibility.
5.7 Supplemental Analysis of Latent Variables
Section 5.5 results show that that SEM models are different between platform
and news valence. In this section, using ANOVA, I compare the means of the four latent
variables: argument quality, perceived usefulness, disclosure credibility and attitude, to
determine whether they vary by platform and news valence. Additionally, I analyze the
latent variables of relevance and investing experience as ELM posits that participants
must have the motivation and ability to elaborate on the message. The sum of the
measured variables for each latent variable was used in the analysis. Assumptions for
normality and constant variance were checked for each variable and were found not to
hold but only varied slightly from normal, as ANOVA is robust to slight departures from
normality and when the cell sizes are balanced is robust to departures from constant
variance, I will rely upon the robustness of ANOVA in the following tests.
Argument quality is measured using the sum of four questions. The overall model
is significant (F=39.04, p<.0001). Table 3, Panel B shows that platform and news has a
significant effect on argument quality at p < 0.0001 and p < 0.0001 respectfully, while
Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are significantly lower from the company
website means. A planned comparison of means by news and platform condition finds
that the Twitter good news mean is significantly lower at -3.3596 difference from the
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Website bad news mean significant at p <0.0001, similar finding is found for the bad
news condition by platform with a difference of -3.3045 significant at p <0.0001.
TABLE 3
How Platform Affects Argument Quality
Panel A: Argument Quality, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform
Twitter
17.6354
[0.3428]

Website
20.9400
[0.3454]

Difference
p-value
-3.3596
<0.0001

Overall
News
19.2877
[0.2433]

Good

19.1773
[0.3454]

22.5920
[0.3445]

-3.3045
<0.0001

20.8846
[0.2430]

Overall Platform

18.4064
[0.2424]

21.7660
0.2439]

Bad

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Argument Credibility (b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
514.4952
514.4952
PLATFORM
1
2277.0616 2277.0616
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
0.6121
0.6121

F-statistic
21.56
95.43
0.03

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
0.8728

(a)This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on argument quality. A
composite measure of argument credibility was computed by summing the four argument
quality questions presented in Table 1.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Perceived usefulness is measured using the sum of four questions. The overall
model is significant (F=31.97, p<.0001). Table 4, Panel B shows that platform and news
has a significant effect perceived usefulness at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0026 respectfully,
while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the company website. A
planned comparison of means by news and platform condition finds that the Twitter
good news mean is significantly lower at -3.8247 difference from the Website bad news
mean significant at p <0.0001, similar finding is found for the bad news condition by
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platform with a difference of -3.8247 significant at p <0.0001.Usefulness of information
has a long history in accounting research, starting with Ball and Brown (1968) and
Beaver (1968). The information approach to financial reporting argues that market
participants want to make their own predictions about future security returns. The logic
then follows that any information that is useful to predicting future security returns will be
desired by market participants. The finding that the participants perceive the social
media platforms as less useful when either good or bad news is posted on them
compared to when the same information is posted on the company website implies that
participants do not find the platform useful for financial disclosures, and thereby
companies would not benefit from using the platforms for financial disclosures.
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TABLE 4
How Platform Affects Perceived Usefulness
Panel A: Argument Quality, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 16.3152
[0.3899]

Website
20.1400
[0.3928]

Difference
p-value
-3.4496
<0.0001

Good 17.6847
[0.3928]

21.1343
[0.3918]

-3.8247
<0.0001

Overall Platform 17.0000
[0.2757]

20.6371
[0.2774]

Overall
News
18.2276
[0.2767]
19.4095
[0.2763]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Perceived Usefulness (b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
F-statistic
NEWS
1
281.8071
281.8071
9.13
PLATFORM
1
2668.8325 2668.8325
86.47
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
7.0973
7.0973
0.23

p-value
0.0026
<.0001
0.6317

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on perceived usefulness. A
composite measure of perceived usefulness was computed by summing the four perceived
usefulness questions presented in Table 1.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of disclosure credibility. The overall
model is significant (F=12.80, p<.0001). Table 5, Panel B shows that platform and news
has a significant effect on disclosure credibility at p < 0.0001 and p < 0.0001
respectfully, while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the
company website means for both good and bad news conditions. A planned comparison
of means by news and platform condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is
significantly lower at -1.4642 difference from the Website bad news mean significant at
p = 0.0146, similar finding is found for the bad news condition by platform with a
difference of -1.5109 significant at p = 0.0201.These findings are interesting as the
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company disclosing, Lafarge S.A., was the same for participants and all participants
saw the same press releases but via different channels or disclosure bundles (Mayew
2012).
TABLE 5
How Platform Affects Disclosure Credibility
Panel A: Argument Quality, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 18.2807
[0.3505]

Website
19.7450
[0.3531]

Difference
p-value
-1.5109
0.0201

Overall
News
19.0128
[0.2487]

Good 19.8472
[0.3505]

21.3582
[0.3522]

-1.4642
0.0146

20.6027
[0.2484]

Overall Platform 19.0640
[0.2478]

20.5516
[0.2493]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Disclosure Credibility (b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
F-statistic
NEWS
1
509.9304
509.9304
20.45
PLATFORM
1
446.4239
446.4239
17.90
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
0.1100
0.1100
0.00

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
0.9471

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on disclosure credibility. A
composite measure of disclosure credibility was computed by summing the four disclosure
credibility questions presented in Table 1.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Table 6 presents the results of the analysis of attitude. The overall model is
significant (F=27.78, p<.0001). Table 6, Panel B shows that platform and news has a
significant effect on attitude at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0001 respectfully, while Panel A
shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the company website means for both
good and bad news conditions. A planned comparison of means by news and platform
condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is significantly lower at -3.2444
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difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p <0.0001, similar finding is
found for the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -3.0088 significant at p
<0.0001. Overall, the results suggest that participants perceive a firm’s use of social
media for financial reporting as foolish, a bad idea, unpleasant and disliked getting
financial reports via the channel.
TABLE 6
How Platform Affects Attitude
Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Bad
Good

Platform
Twitter
17.2955
[0.3780]

Website
20.5400
[0.3809]

Difference
p-value
-3.0088
<0.0001

Overall
News
18.9177
[0.2683]

18.8916
[0.3780]

21.9004
[0.3799]

-3.2444
<0.0001

20.3960
[0.2680]

Overall Platform

18.0935
21.2202
[0.2673]
[0.2690]
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Attitude (b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
NEWS
1
440.8673
PLATFORM
1
1972.2174
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
2.7986

MS F-statistic
440.8673
15.19
1972.2174
67.96
2.7986
0.10

p-value
0.0001
<.0001
0.7562

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on attitude. A composite
measure of attitude was computed by summing the four disclosure attitude questions
presented in Table 1.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Table 7 presents the results of the analysis of relevance. The overall model is
significant (F=59.55, p<.0001). Table 7, Panel B shows that platform and news has a
significant effect on relevance at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0152 respectfully, while Panel A
shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the company website means for both
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good and bad news conditions. A planned comparison of means by news and platform
condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is significantly lower at
-4.0308 difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p <0.0001, similar
finding is found for the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -3.6645
significant at p <0.0001.
TABLE 7
How Platform Affects Relevance
Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 12.3891
[0.2922]

Website
16.4200
[0.2944]

Difference
p-value
-3.6645
<0.0001

Overall
News
14.4045
[0.2074]

Good 13.2857
[0.2922]

16.9502
[0.2936]

-4.0308
<0.0001

15.1179
[0.2071]

Overall Platform 12.8374
[0.2066]

16.6851
[0.2079]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Relevance (b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
102.6743 102.6743
PLATFORM
1
2986.7216 2986.7216
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
6.7673
6.7673

F-statistic
5.92
172.27
0.39

p-value
0.0152
<.0001
0.5323

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on relevance. A composite
measure of relevance was computed by summing the three disclosure relevance questions
presented in Table 1.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Investing experience is the average of age, investing experience and work
experience. The overall model with platform, news and the interaction of platform and
news is insignificant (F=0.24, p<.8718), so no further tests were conducted.
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Table 8 presents the results of the analysis of attractiveness. The overall model
is significant (F=22.96, p<.0001). Table 8, Panel B shows that news has a significant
effect on attractiveness at p < 0.0001, while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter
are higher from the company website means for both good and bad news conditions but
not significantly so. A planned comparison of means shows that the means are not
significantly different across platforms.
TABLE 8
How Platform Affects Attractiveness of Stock
Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 6.5227
[0.1634]

Website
6.2960
[0.1679]

Difference
p-value
0.2267
1.0000

Overall
News
6.7784
[0.0990]

0.0110
1.0000

7.9304
[0.0989]

Good

8.1654
[0.1592]

8.1544
[0.1610]

Overall Platform

7.4285
[0.0986]

7.2803
[0.0992]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Attractiveness of Stock(b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
267.7140 267.4140
PLATFORM
1
4.4345
4.4345
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
0.3015
0.3015

F-statistic
67.72
1.12
0.08

p-value
<.0001
0.2899
0.7825

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on attractiveness of stock.
Attractiveness of stock is measured using a 11 point Likert scale.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Table 9 presents the results of the analysis of stock recommendation. The overall
model is significant (F=17.61, p<.0001). Table 9, Panel B shows that news has a
significant effect on stock recommendation at p < 0.0001 but that platform is not
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significant at p > 0.10, while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are higher from
the company website means for bad news conditions and lower in the good news
condition. A planned comparison of means shows that the means are not significantly
different across platforms confirming the ANOVA.
TABLE 9
How Platform Affects Stock Recommendation
Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 241.3448
[28.9963]

Website
233.0400
[29.2130]

Difference
p-value
8.3048
1.0000

Overall
News
237.1924
[20.5802]

Good 433.7881
[28.9963]

461.6069
[29.1402]

-27.8188
1.0000

447.6975
[20.5544]

Overall Platform 337.5665
[20.5035]

347.3234
[20.6310]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Stock Recommendation (b)
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
8939659.84
8939659.84
PLATFORM
1
19205.53
19205.53
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
65813.94
65813.94

F-statistic
52.38
0.11
0.39

p-value
<.0001
0.7374
0.5348

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on stock recommendation. Stock
recommendation is measured between -1000 to 1000 shares.
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Recommended time to hold stock was measured on slider scale from 0 to 120
representing the number of months. The overall model with platform, news and the
interaction of platform and news is insignificant (F=0.88, p= 0.4533), so no further tests
were conducted.
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5.8 Test of Hypothesis Two and Three
The above models show that investors process information differently depending
on the communication channel and that those channels have consequences to the
company by affecting perceptions of management credibility. However, it is important to
determine whether management credibility is actually different between conditions. H2
predicts that participants will judge management as less credible when viewing financial
disclosures posted on the company’s Twitter feed than on the company’s investor
relations web page. H3 predicts that Twitter will moderate the effect of positive or
negative financial news on the judgments of retail investors, compared to the same
news released on traditional media (i.e. the company’s investor relations web page). To
test these hypotheses, I first conduct an omnibus two-way ANOVA with Platform and
News Valence and Platform X News Valence interaction terms as independent
variables and the sum of the two management credibility questions as the dependent
variable.
The overall model is significant (F = 8.85, p < 0.0001). Table 10 presents the
results of the analysis. Panel B shows a statistically significant main effect for both news
valence (F = 18.39, two-tailed p < 0.0001) and a statistically significant main effect for
platform (F = 7.70, p < 0.01) but not a statistically significant interaction between
Platform and News Valence. The statistically significant main effect of Platform along
with the mean of 14.6083 for Twitter versus a mean of 15.3877 for investor relations
web page in Panel B support H2. A planned comparison of means by news and
platform condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is marginally lower at -0.6000
difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p =0.0966 two-tailed, while
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the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -0.9587 and is not statistically
significant.
TABLE 10
How Platform Affects Management Credibility
Tests of H2 & H3
Panel A: Management Credibility, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 13.9162
[0.2800]

Website
14.875
[0.2821]

Difference
p-value
-0.6000
0.0966

Overall
News
14.3956
[0.1987]

Good 15.3004
[0.2800]

15.9004
[0.2814]

-0.9587
0.7869

15.6004
[0.1985]

Overall Platform 14.6083
[0.1980]

15.3877
[0.1992]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Management Credibility
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
292.8692
292.87
PLATFORM
1
122.5427
122.54
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
6.4907
6.49

F-statistic
18.39
7.70
0.41

p-value
<.0001
0.0057
0.5234

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management
credibility. A composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing
the two management credibility questions presented in Table 1.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

The results support the idea that investor’s view management as less credible
after viewing financial disclosures that have been posted on social media than after
viewing the same financial disclosure from the company’s investor relations web page.
These results are particularly important to CEOs and CFOs, as they have the final say
over what additional channels to release financial information on beyond the SEC
mandated channels and guide company communication strategy (Holland 2005).
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For Twitter to moderate the effects of news valence I predicted that the mean for
Twitter and Good News would be less than the mean for investor relations web page
and Good News and the mean for Twitter and Bad News would be higher than investor
relations web page and Bad News. I expected the Platform X News Valence interaction
to be significant. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant, failing to
support H3.
5.9 Additional Tests of Hypothesis Two and Three
To check the robustness of my findings for H2 and H2, I dropped the participants
that failed the manipulation check. I lose 276 observations by during so but the cell
sizes are still approximately equal with 132 in the Twitter-Bad News condition, 125 in
the Website-Bad News condition, 139 in the Twitter-Good News condition, and 136 in
the Website-Good News condition. ANOVA is robust to slight variations from normal
when cell sizes are with 1.5 times of each other, as all of the cells within the bounds the
robustness of ANOVA is relied upon the following tests. The reduced model is
significant (F = 11.53, p < 0.0001). Table 11 presents the results of the analysis. Panel
B shows a statistically significant main effect for both news valence (F = 25.76, twotailed p < 0.0001) and a statistically significant main effect for platform (F = 8.41, p
=0.0039) but not a statistically significant interaction between Platform and News
Valence. The statistically significant main effect of Platform along with the mean of
14.4253 for Twitter versus a mean of 15.4443 for investor relations web page in Panel B
give further support to H2. Additional support A planned comparison of means by news
and platform condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is marginally lower at 0.8762 difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p =0.1313 two-tailed,
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while the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -1.1619 and is not
statistically significant.
TABLE 11
How Platform Affects Management Credibility Less Manipulation Failures
Additional Tests of H2 & H3
Panel A: Management Credibility, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 531(a)
News

Platform

Twitter
Bad 13.4621
[0.3524]

Website
14.6240
[0.3621]

Difference
p-value
-0.8762
0.1313

Overall
News
14.0430
[0.2526]

Good 15.3884
[0.3434]

16.2647
[0.3472]

-1.1619
0.4402

15.8265
[0.2441]

Overall Platform 14.4253
[0.2460]

15.4443
[0.2508]

Panel B: ANOVA Model of Management Credibility
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
422.4028
422.4028
PLATFORM
1
137.8959
137.8959
NEWS x PLATFORM
1
2.7089
2.7089

F-statistic
25.76
8.41
0.17

p-value
<.0001
0.0039
0.6846

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management credibility.
A composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing the two
management credibility questions presented in Table 1.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

An additional ANCOVA was ran to test whether including the control variables of
how often the participants use the platform they saw the company press releases on
(USER), how familiar they are with Lafarge S.A.(FAMIL), and how often they review
financial statements (REVIEW). The results are presented in Table 12. The model is
significant at (F=7.56, p <0.0001). The variables of news is significant at p < 0.0001
along with platform p = 0.0398 one-tailed per hypothesis, p = 0.0797 two-tailed.
However, of the three control variables on how often participant’s use the platform
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(USER) is significant at p = 0.0013, familiarity with Lafarge (FAMIL) and how often they
review financial statements is not.
Table 12
ANCOVA Model of Management Credibility n=807
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
NEWS
1
257.1986
257.1986
PLATFORM
1
48.1078
48.1078
USER
1
163.8917
163.8917
FAMIL
1
56.1895
56.1895
REVIEW
1
6.0576
6.0576
NEWS*PLATFORM
1
3.3973
3.3973

F-statistic
16.46
3.08
10.49
3.60
0.39
0.22

p-value
<.0001
0.0797
0.0013
0.0583
0.5337
0.6411

(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management credibility.
A composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing the two
management credibility questions presented in Table 1.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed
analyst forecasts), USER = how frequently the participant uses the platform on 7 point Likert
scale, FAMIL = how familiar the participant is with Lafarge on 7 point Likert scale, REVIEW =
how often the participant reviews financial statement on 7 point Likert scale, NEWS x
PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

Table 13 shows the ANCOVA model with the manipulation failures dropped from
the sample. The model is significant (F = 7.57, p < 0.0001), the news variable is still
significant at p < 0.0001 and the platform variable strengthens from p = 0.0797 twotailed in the full sample to p = 0.0179 after the manipulation failures are dropped. USER
is no longer significant but familiarity is at p = 0.0287 two-tailed. Review of financial
statements continues to be statistically insignificant as does the interaction of news and
platform.
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Table 13
ANCOVA Model of Management Credibility Less Manipulation Failures n=531
Source of Variation
DF
Type III SS
MS
F-statistic
p-value
NEWS
1
379.7035
379.7035
23.48
<.0001
PLATFORM
1
91.2175
91.2175
5.64
0.0179
USER
1
48.0833
48.0833
2.97
0.0852
FAMIL
1
77.8119
77.8119
4.81
0.0287
REVIEW
1
2.6172
2.6172
0.16
0.6876
NEWS*PLATFORM
1
2.0038
2.0038
0.12
0.7250
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management credibility. A
composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing the two
management credibility questions presented in Table 1.
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed
analyst forecasts), USER = how frequently the participant uses the platform on 7 point Likert
scale, FAMIL = how familiar the participant is with Lafarge on 7 point Likert scale, REVIEW =
how often the participant reviews financial statement on 7 point Likert scale, NEWS x
PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform.

As the sum variable of the two management credibility questions was perfectly
normally distributed a non-parametric test Wilcoxon Rank Sum test was run to test the
differences in the scores between platform and news valence. The results are
presented in Table 14 for the full sample. The non-parametric tests show that the
management credibility differs by platform p = 0.0197 two-tailed and by news valence p
< 0.0001 further supporting H2. Table 13 present the non-parametric test of the sample
after manipulation failures were removed the results are even stronger with platform
significant at p = 0.0107 compared to a p = 0.0197 for the full sample, the news
condition is the still significant at p < 0.0001.
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Table 14
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Management Credibility
Panel A: Full Sample n = 807
Condition
N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Twitter
406
385.0394
3300.0484
Platform
401
423.1970
3300.0484
Z-Score
p-valuea
Good
Bad

2.3325
0.0197
403
404

Z-Score
p-valuea

370.9851
436.9331

3300.1092
3300.0192

-4.0315
< 0.0001

Panel B: Less Manipulation Failures n = 531
Condition
N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Twitter
271
249.8726
1766.1575
Platform
261
283.7643
1766.1575
Z-Score
p-valuea
Good
Bad
Z-Score
p-valuea
a

2.5510
0.0107
257
275

234.7354
296.1854

1765.4582
1765.4582

-4.6237
< 0.0001

Two-tailed significance level

Overall, the results support the hypothesis that participants’ perceptions of management
credibility will differ by platform, in support of H2 but not that there is an interaction
failing to support H3.
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I explore the effects of financial information press release announcements on
social media platforms and more traditional electronic platforms, and whether doing so
influences how retail investors process the information. I investigate how the platform on
which financial information is presented affects the route through which the information
is processed by investors, and the ensuing impact on their beliefs regarding
management credibility. The results reveal that retail investors process financial
information posted on Twitter via the peripheral or unconscious route more than the
central or conscious route, extending the theory of product channel fit to the context of
information processing. This is the first study to investigate how information is perceived
and processed across different communication channels. Additionally, I find that
financial disclosures on social media are associated with lower overall investor belief of
management credibility which, I show to significantly influence investor judgment and
decisions about the company. I find similar results after breaking out the participants to
those that saw either good or bad news and the channel on which they saw the news.
Participants that viewed financial disclosures on social media, in both the good and bad
news conditions had lower perceptions of the disclosure in regard to argument quality,
usefulness and credibility. However, participants’ perceptions of stock attractiveness,
the number of shares they recommended to buy or sell to the investment club, or the
number of months to hold the stock did not differ between platforms. It was only news
valence that affected these measures, with good news associated with higher levels of
attractiveness and higher number of recommended shares. There was no significant
interaction between platform and news valence. These findings confirm one of the
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central tenets of ELM-- that individuals can process the same information differently but
still arrive at the same judgment and decision. The ELM argument holds true in the this
study as I find that peripheral (central) route processing is associated with lower (higher)
perceptions of management credibility but not stock attractiveness, stock
recommendation or recommended time to hold. Management credibility has been found
to be an important factor in management’s ability to communicate information to the
capital markets (Williams 1996, Hirst et al. 1999, Mercer 2004). Decreased
management credibility explains why Jung et al. (2014) find that small investors do not
respond to news releases via Twitter and why more communication is required of
management via social media during product recalls. Thus, my study’s results are
important, as I provide evidence of the effect of disclosure media on management
credibility, which in turn significantly affects the immediate judgments and decisions
regarding stock attractiveness and purchase.
My results provide important insights for both companies and investors. Due to
the multitude of communication channels available, companies must decide which
channels allow them to reach the most investors with the same message. The research
provides insight into how potential investors view financial information from companies
and shows that financial information is processed differently across channels, despite
coming from the same source, due to lack of fit between the message and the channel.
In particular, the results of the research are informative to CEOs, CFOs and other
executives responsible for financial reporting. I find that financial information
disseminated on new communication channels (Twitter is under 10 years old and was
only widely adopted beginning in 2009) are perceived as having lower argument quality,
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credibility, and usefulness with retail investors overall having a lower attitude towards
the channel. These diminished perceptions result in decreased perceptions of
management credibility. The lack of management credibility could necessitate more
disclosures, particularly for disclosures that lack fit, via the channel to have the same
effect as fewer disclosures on more traditional channels where perceptions of
management are higher. However, the benefits to management still exist as perceptual
and attitudinal changes that occur via the peripheral route are less persistent, open to
counter influence, and less predictive of future behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986),
indicating that management that engages an audience via new communication
channels could ultimately be more successful in persuading the audience to their point
of view versus withdrawing and using more traditional channels where central route
processing is more dominant. Perception/attitude changes that occur via the central
route are, in general, more stable, more enduring, and are more predictive of long-term
behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) indicating that reverting to more traditional
channels may not have the result desired by management if the goal is to change
perceptions only temporarily..
Similarly, for investors, the information environment has changed markedly on
where to obtain company information. Investors seeking to make optimal investing
decisions can benefit from the study, as it shows that the communication channel that
the investor first receives the information alters how the investor processes the
information. For less experienced investors, starting at a social media channel to obtain
financial information may cause them to miss important information about the company.

82

The results of this study should be interpreted considering its limitations. First,
participants were asked to recommend increases or decreases to only 1,000 shares
held by a hypothetical investment club and limited to that range in the experiment. The
1,000 anchor may have resulted in decreased variability in the recommendations.
Previous research on investment recommendation has used 10,000 shares (Farkas and
Murthy 2013) and 100,000 shares (Elliot et al. 2012). It is possible that increasing the
number of shares held will increase variability; a possibility that can be tested in future
research.
There are many avenues for future research on the role of social media in
accounting. Future research could investigate whether the salience of the accounting
information in the Twitter posts influences investors and how so, in this study investors
only saw announcements of earnings in the Twitter posts but no actual accounting
numbers. It would be interesting to investigate how tweets about specific financial
events that are not earnings related influence investors. Additionally, in this study the
source of the tweets was the company and tied to any one individual within the
company. A number of CEOs and CFOs and other executives within companies are
active on Twitter and it would be interesting to know if individuals with high credibility
within the social network or community have lower credibility as a result of using social
media for Reg FD disclosures. Furthermore, research on the role of community
sentiment, as measured by likes or the number of followers and the subsequent
influence on investors and other decision makers, could be informative to both investors
and management. Finally, in this study I use financial disclosures from a business to
business firm; it is unknown whether similar results would be found for firms that are
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primarily consumer or serviced oriented and have high social status firms, as measured
by number of followers, has on investors.
In summary, I find that when product-channel fit is low, retail investors process
information unconsciously compared to when product-channel fit is high and retail
investors process the information consciously. The effect is particularly pronounced
when retail investors viewed good news from the firm. Additionally, I find that when
product-channel fit is low, management credibility is lower compared to when productchannel fit is high. Understanding the interaction of message and channel and
subsequent effects on decisions is both timely and important.
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APPENDIX A – EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Experiment Procedures
1. Informed Consent

a. Non-professional Investor Question
b. Informed Consent

2. Introduction

a. Case Material
b. Profile of Lafarge
c. Lafarge financial ratios vs. industry
d. Map of countries where Lafarge operates

3. Main Experiment

a. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR)
b. Lafarge Q2 2012 press release
c. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR)
d. Lafarge sells assets press release
e. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR)
f. Lafarge Q3 2012 press release
g. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR)
h. Announce of joint venture
i. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR)
j. Reuters news articles announcing Lafarge
misses (bad news) or beats (good news).
k. Lafarge 2012 Annual Results press release

4. Main Experiment
Questions

a. Attractiveness as an investment
b. Recommendation
c. Time recommendation
d. Justification
e. Management competence
f. Trust in management
g. Manipulation question
h. ELM questions
i. Post experimental questionnaire
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APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
Have bought or sold stocks in the past 12 months?
 Yes
 No
Page Break
I appreciate you taking the time to respond to this research survey. The primary
objective of this study is to obtain a better understanding of how effective it is for
companies to invest in social media initiatives. Additionally, I hope to better understand
when it is desirable for companies to invest in social media initiatives. You will be asked
to read some press releases from a company and then provide your opinions on the use
of technologies by companies. You must be 18 or older in order to participate in this
research survey.
Please note that your responses to this research survey are anonymous. In addition,
please note that completion of the survey is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time
but that, as mentioned, I strongly believe you will find the research interesting. The
survey should take no more than 30 minutes to complete. During that time you will be
asked to indicate your social media preferences. Your responses will be compiled with
other participants. Then, I will examine how your responses compare to other
individuals.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me, Neal Snow
(the Principal Investigator in charge of this research study) at 813-974-6863. This study,
titled "Information Processing Study," is IRB study #12268. If you have questions about
your rights as a participant in this study, general questions, or complaints, concerns or
issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research study, call the Division of
Research Integrity and Compliance at the University of South Florida at 813-974-5638.
If you are interested in participating, please click the “Next” button below. By clicking the
“Next” button you are confirming that are you 18 years or older.
You must complete the study and enter in the unique id given at the end in order to
receive payment Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Sincerely,
Neal Snow
Principal Investigator
University of South Florida
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For the purpose of the survey, please imagine that you have joined a local investment
club. At the last meeting the club asked you to monitor, evaluate, and make a
recommendation (up to 1,000 shares) for the club regarding one company, Lafarge
S.A.. The club currently holds 1,000 shares in the company.
You will be shown a profile of the company to familiarize you with the company followed
by additional information from the company that was released on popular investor
relation sites during 2012 and 2013.
Using the information, you will then be asked to make and justify a recommendation to
the club regarding whether the club should increase or decrease its investment in the
company. You may want to take notes on the information that you view to help you
make the recommendation.
Please note, depending on your internet speed some pages may take a few seconds to
load.
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Lafarge S.A. produces and sells building materials under the Lafarge brand worldwide.
The company produces and sells a range of cement and hydraulic binders, including basic Portland and masonry
cements, and various other blended and specialty cements and binders for the construction industry. It also offers
technical support, ordering and logistical assistance, documentation, demonstrations, and training services relating to the
use of cements, as well as engages in cement trading activities. In addition, the company produces and sells aggregates,
which comprise hard rock, such as limestone and granite; natural sand, gravel, recycled asphalt, and ready mix concrete,
as well as products and services relating to paving activities. Further, it provides wallboard and finishing products, as well
as gypsum plaster, plaster blocks, joint compounds, metal studs, anhydrite binders for self-leveling floorscreeds, and
industrial plasters.
The company sells its products to concrete producers, precast concrete product manufacturers, contractors, builders,
masons, building materials wholesalers, asphalt producers, road contractors, construction companies, general building
materials distributors, plasterboard installers, wallboard specialty dealers, do-it-yourself home centers, and transforming
industries. The company, formerly known as J. et A. Pavin de Lafarge, was founded in 1833 and is headquartered in
Paris, France.
Lafarge S.A. trades on the Paris Stock Exchange under the symbol LG.
Source: BloombergBusinessWeek
Financial ratios
Total
Total
Current r Lt debt
debt to Lt debt debt to
Company name
atio
to assets assets to equity equity
Lafarge S.A.
1.11
29.14
36.91
74.24 94.02
Industry Average 1.49
27.03
31.60
102.88 116.51
Data Source: FactSet via Google Finance
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Operating metrics
Return Return
on avg on avg Return on
assets equity investment
1.92
3.67
2.53
1.17
0.96
1.80

Lafarge operates in 58 countries and has 68,000 employees as of 12/31/2011.
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Figure B1 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed

Figure B2 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page
100

Figure B3 Screenshot Lafarge Q2 Press Release Shown to All Participants
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Figure B4 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed Second Time Shown

Figure B5 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Second Time Shown
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Figure B6 Screenshot Lafarge Press Release Sale of Assets in USA Shown to All
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Figure B7 Screenshot of Lafarge Twitter Feed Third Time Shown

Figure B8 Screenshot of Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Third Time Shown
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Figure B9 Screenshot Lafarge Q3 Press Release Shown to All Participants
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Figure B10 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed Fourth Time Shown

Figure B11 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Fourth Time Shown
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Figure B12 Screenshot Lafarge Joint Venture Press Release Shown to All
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Figure B13 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed Fifth Time Shown

Figure B14 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Fifth Time Shown
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Figure B15 Screenshot Reuters Article on Lafarge Missing Forecasts Shown to all
in Bad News Condition
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Figure B16 Screenshot Reuter Article on Lafarge Missing Forecats Shown to all in
Good News Condition
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Figure B17 Screenshot Lafarge Annual Report Press Release Shown to All
111

How attractive is Lafarge as an investment?
Very
2
3
4
5
unattractive
1










6

7

8

9

10

Very
attractive
11













By what number of shares do you recommend the investment club change its current
1,000 share investment in Lafarge S.A.? (decrease/increase up to 1000 shares)
______ Number of shares
How long do you recommend the investment club hold its investment in Lafarge S.A.?
______ Number of months
Please list one to three key factors for your recommendation below.
Page Break
I think Lafarge S.A.'s management has the <b>competence</b> necessary to make
clear and unbiased financial disclosures on Twitter.
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1
11






















I <b>trust</b> Lafarge S.A.'s management to make clear and unbiased financial
disclosures on Twitter.
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1
11














Page Break
Did Lafarge S.A., meet, beat or miss analyst forecasts in the fourth quarter?
 Meet
 Beat
 Miss
Page Break
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Approximately how many followers did the Lafarge Twitter feed have?
 Less than 5,000 followers
 Between 5,000 and 10,000 followers
 Between 10,000 and 50,000 followers
 Greater than 50,000 followers
 Page Break
Financial information provided through the company's Twitter feed was...
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
7

Informative















Helpful
Valuable






















Persuasive















Financial information provided through the company's Twitter feed was...
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1
7
Trustworthy















Credible















Honest















Reliable












Page Break
Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information...
Strongly
2
3
4
5
Disagree
1
increased my
productivity (e.g.,
make my work
faster).
increased my
performance (e.g.,
make my work
better).
made me more
effective (e.g.,
helped me make
better decisions).

6

Strongly
Agree
7
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I found the company's Twitter feed to be useful for obtaining financial information.
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1
7












Page Break
Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information was...
Strongly Disagree
2
3
4
5
6
1
important.
relevant
(appropriate).
necessary.



Strongly
Agree
7











































Page Break
Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information was a _______ idea.
Bad
2
3
4
5
6
Good
1
7







Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information was a ________ idea.
Foolish
2
3
4
5
6
Wise
1
7














Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information was _________ .
Unpleasant
2
3
4
5
6
Pleasant
1
7
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Overall, I _______ the idea of obtaining financial information from the company's Twitter
feed.
Dislike
2
3
4
5
6
Like
1
7














Page Break
How often do you use Twitter?
Never
2
1




3

4

5

6

A great
deal
7











Questions for participants in company website condition
Financial information provided through the company's website was...
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
Disagree
1

Strongly
Agree
7

Informative















Helpful
Valuable






















Persuasive















Page Break
Financial information provided through the company's website was...
Strongly
2
3
4
5
Disagree
1

6

Strongly
Agree
7

Trustworthy















Credible















Honest















Reliable















Page Break
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Using the company's website to obtain financial information...
Strongly
2
3
4
Disagree
1
increased my
productivity (e.g., make
my work faster).
increased my
performance (e.g.,
make my work better).
made me more
effective (e.g., help me
make better decisions).

5

6

Strongly
Agree
7











































I found the company's website to be useful for obtaining financial information.
Strongly
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1
7







Page Break
Using the company's website to obtain financial information was...
Strongly
2
3
4
5
Disagree
1

6

Strongly
Agree
7

important.















relevant
(appropriate).















necessary.















Page Break
Using the company's website to obtain financial information was a _______ idea.
Bad
2
3
4
5
6
Good
1
7
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Using the company's website to obtain financial information was a _______ idea.
Foolish
2
3
4
5
6
Wise
1
7














Using the company's website to obtain financial information was _______ .
Unpleasant<br>1
2
3
4
5
6
Pleasant
7














Overall, I _______ the idea of obtaining financial information from the company's
website.
Dislike
2
3
4
5
6
Like
1
7














4

5

6

A great
deal
7









4

5

6

A great
deal
7









Page Break
How often do you visit company websites?
Never
2
3
1






Post Experiment Questionnaire
How often do you visit company websites?
Never
2
3
1






Before taking this study, how familiar were you with Lafarge S.A.?
Not at all
2
3
4
5
familiar
1
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6

Very
familiar
7





How old are you? _________
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 Less than High School
 High School / GED
 Some College
 2-year College Degree
 4-year College Degree
 Masters Degree
 Doctoral Degree
 Professional Degree (JD, MD)
How many years of professional work experience do you have? _________
How many accounting classes have you taken post high school?
 0
 1
 2
 3
 5
 6 or more
How many business classes have you taken post high school?
 0
 1-4
 5-9
 10 - 14
 15 or more
How many years of investing experience do you have?
How often do you review company financial information
 Daily
 Weekly
 Monthly
 3-4 times a year
 Once a year
 Never
What broker do you use to trade stocks, bonds or mutual funds? __________
How much does your broker charge per trade? __________
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On a balance sheet, Assets = Liabilities + ______
 Stockholder's Equity
 Revenue
 Net Income
 Long Term Liabilities
Do you have any comments or suggestions about this survey?
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3/20/2013
Neal Snow, M.A.
School of Accountancy
4202 East Fowler Ave.
Tampa, FL 33620
RE:
IRB#:
Title:

Exempt Certification
Pro00012268
Information Processing Study

Study Approval Period: 3/20/2013 to 3/20/2018
Approved Items:
Protocol Document:
Snow eIRB Protocol
Informed Consent Script:
IRB_Letter.docx
Dear Dr. Snow:
On 3/20/2013, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets USF
requirements and Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in the federal regulations at
45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement),
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless:
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified,
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in
the Belmont Report and with USF IRB policies and procedures. Please note that changes to this
protocol may disqualify it from exempt status. Please note that you are responsible for notifying
the IRB prior to implementing any changes to the currently approved protocol.
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The Institutional Review Board will maintain your exemption application for a period of five
years from the date of this letter or for three years after a Final Progress Report is received,
whichever is longer. If you wish to continue this protocol beyond five years, you will need to
submit a new application at least 60 days prior to the end of your exemption approval period.
Should you complete this study prior to the end of the five-year period, you must submit a
request to close the study.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board
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